Odw. Edwards

1789

THE POETIC OF ARISTOTLE

translated from the Greek,

WITH NOTES.

BY

HENRY JAMES PYE ESQ

LONDON,
Printed for John Stockdale Piccadilly
MDCCLXXXVIII.

BRITISH MUSEUM

PREFACE.

THOUGH England has produced many valuable editions of Ariſtotle's Poetic, and many ingenious commentators on that ineſtimable work, yet they have all been confined to the learned languages; and while our neighbours on the continent abound in tranſlations, it is almoſt entirely ſhut up from the mere Engliſh reader. It is true, Fabricius, in his Bibliotheca

Græca, mentions a tranſlation of it by Rimer, printed in 1674, but which I never could procure a ſight of; and there is an Engliſh verſion of Dacier's French one. There was, alſo, an anonymous one, publiſhed in 1775, of which I ſhall only ſay, that, though ſome detached paſſages are well executed, the ſenſe of others is frequently miſtaken, and the tranſlation in general ſo literal, as to be abſolutely unintelligible to any perſon not acquainted with the original.

That which is now ſubmitted to the public, was undertaken merely for the purpoſe of fixing my own attention more ſtrongly while I was reading

ing the Poetic; but, on ſhewing it to a perſon of the firſt literary eminence in this country, whoſe name, did I think myſelf at liberty to mention it, would confer the higheſt honor on me, I was perſuaded, by an approbation too flattering for me to reſiſt, to prepare it for the preſs. In conſequence of this, I have uſed every endeavour in my power to render it as little unworthy the public eye as poſſible, and have got every aſſiſtance, and ſtudied every edition and commentator, within my reach, during the ſpace of ſix years that it has lain by me. And I ſhould here be ungrateful, if I did not acknowledge what I owe, in common with every

reader, to the excellent edition of the Poetic publiſhed by Mr. Winſtanley, as well as my particular obligations to that gentleman, for many corrections of my tranſlation, and ſeveral valuable remarks which he had the goodneſs to communicate to me. In juſtice to him, I muſt add, that, wherever his name is mentioned in the ſubſequent notes, it was done before I was introduced to his acquaintance, and when I had not any idea of his ever ſeeing the work prior to its publication.

How my own tranſlation is executed, I ſhall not preſume to ſay. What I have tried to do I will ſtate in

in a very few words. I have not made the leaſt attempt at elegance of ſtyle. I have only endeavoured to render in Engliſh, as clearly as poſſible, what I conceived to be the meaning of Ariſtotle; and as nearly in his own words as was conſiſtent with perſpicuity. But as perſpicuity was my firſt object, I have not ſcrupuled to paraphraſe thoſe paſſages, that, in a more literal verſion, muſt have been obſure at leaſt, if not unintelligible.

And here I beg leave to obſerve the great advantages that Latin interpreters have over thoſe who tranſlate into a living language; and I

cannot do it better, than by quoting the following extract from Dr. Gillie's tranſlation of the Orations of Lyſias: "An ingenious French author * "obſerves, that a Latin tranſlator "glides over difficulties with impu- "nity; when he cannot reſolve, he "eludes them; involves his enigmas "in ſuch expreſſions as convey an "agreeable ſound, without any de- "termined ſenſe, and the reader a- "ſcribes the obſcurity, at leaſt in "part, to his own ignorance. But "whoever tranſlates into a modern "language, muſt ſpeak intelligibly. "Every one deems himſelf a ſuffi-

* Tourreil.

"cient

" cient judge of his labors, and it is " an unalterable rule to refer all that " is good and excellent to the ori- " ginal, and all that is bad or indif- " ferent to the copy."

There are few works of antiquity that require greater attention in the tranſlator, than the Poetic of Ariſtotle, as few appear to have come down to us with ſo corrupted a text, and have conſequently afforded ſo wide a field to the imagination of commentators. This is no where ſo evident as in thoſe chapters where fragments of the poets are cited. Indeed, theſe in general are ſo partial and mutilated, that they appear like extracts from a

common-place book, where a few words only of the intended quotation are ſet down from memory; and it is impoſſible to render thoſe chapters at all intelligible, without a conſiderable degree of liberty in paraphraſing, and ſome little boldneſs of conjecture. The number of parentheſes which occur, are alſo ſtrong obſtacles both to perſpicuity and elegance. Theſe ariſe chiefly from the ancients never doing what is ſo common among the moderns; throwing any neceſſary obſervation, which cannot conveniently be interwoven in the body of the work, into a note at the bottom of the page; a practice, which, though in general it may have a tendency

dency to produce careleſſneſs of arrangement, in a work of this nature is ſingularly convenient, but which was never adopted by the ancients, as, from the difficulty of multiplying copies, their compoſitions were rather intended for public recitation than private peruſal.

There ſeems alſo to be ſome defect in the arrangement of the whole treatiſe, on which account Heinſius tranſpoſed ſeveral of the chapters. But though he was himſelf very proud *

* He was ſo pleaſed with his new arrangement, that, comparing it with the uſual one, he ſays, with no ſmall degree of arrogance, "Si quis glandes "poſt ariſtas maluit, iis fruatur."

of

of his performance, it is liable to ſo many objections, that I have rather choſen to adhere to the common order, though apparently defective.

The notes I have added are chiefly intended either to explain difficult paſſages, or to give my reaſons for adopting particular readings. I have very ſeldom entered into general criticiſm, reſerving every thing of that kind for a larger work, which I have been collecting materials for, while I was employed in the execution of this. What I propoſe, is a continued commentary on the Poetic, illuſtrated by examples drawn from the modern, and particularly the Engliſh drama;

drama; an inquiry into the nature of imitation as effected by the arts, and eſpecially by poetry; a compariſon of the advantages and defects of the ancient and modern drama; and an examination of Ariſtotle's ideas of the nature and end of tragedy, from which what we commonly term poetical juſtice ſeems excluded, and his predilection for the unhappy cataſtrophe, where all are involved in common diſtreſs, in preference to that where vice alone is puniſhed and virtue rewarded, and how far theſe ideas are applicable to the modern drama, and modern manners, as diſtinguiſhed from thoſe of antiquity. Such is at preſent the extent of my plan; the execution

execution of it may depend on many circumſtances, and, among others, on the poſſibility of my thoughts on the ſubject being anticipated in the intended publication of Mr. Nares.

Strange prejudices have been entertained in England with regard to this celebrated treatiſe. Though much talked of, it has been little read, and greatly miſrepreſented; and the abſurd refinements of the French critics have been falſely imputed to the precepts of Ariſtotle. Of this notion, a peruſal of the treatiſe will be a ſufficient confutation. It is true, that unity of action, and uniformity of character, are ſtrongly inſiſted on, becauſe

becauſe they have both their foundation in nature and reaſon. There is alſo a boundary fixed to the duration of the dramatic action, ſhorter, perhaps, than is requiſite in the modern drama, but certainly very ample for the ancient *, where the ſtage is always

* In the ancient drama, where the ſtage is always full, I muſt think probability in ſome meaſure violated, if the time of action is in the leaſt extended beyond what the performance actually takes up. On the modern ſtage a conſiderable time may be ſuppoſed to elapſe between the acts, without any diſguſt to our feelings: but it is different even there, when the duration is marked by any circumſtance of the repreſentation. To take an example from King Lear. In the ſecond act, Lear comes in with all his train to Regan, at Gloceſter's caſtle, having been recently affronted by Goneril. From the circumſtance of the ſtorm continuing, it is

always filled by a number of perſons who unite the characters of ſpectator and actor, and the action is never in-

is obvious no time intervenes between the ſecond and third acts, and it is evident the eyes of Gloceſter are put out the ſame night, juſt as he had relieved the old king on the heath. Yet, in this time, "there is part of a power already footed to "revenge the injuries the king now bears." And Cornwall ſays, "The army of France is now land-"ed." Though, in this place, as Ariſtotle ſays of the Odyſſey, in chapter xxiv. the impoſſibility is compenſated by greater beauties, yet ſtill it is a fault, and that fault muſt always have attended any violation of the unity of time in the ancient drama, from the continued preſence of the chorus. There is a ſtriking inſtance of this in the Suppliants of Euripides, where Theſeus marches from Athens to Thebes, gains a complete victory, and a meſſenger returns to give an account of the battle, during a ſhort lyric dialogue between his mother Æthra and the chorus.

terrupted.

terrupted. But of the unity of place there is no mention, though it was generally, yet not univerſally, adopted by the Grecian theatre. So far from authorizing the dull declamatory dialogue of the French theatre, action is characterized as the ſoul of tragedy, and even the * ſtage decoration conſidered as one of the conſtituent parts of the drama, and, though allowed to be the leaſt dependent on the ſkill of the poet, declared to be the moſt intereſting to the ſpectator. In a word, the Engliſh reader, accuſtomed to judge for himſelf in every thing, and only to ſubmit to

* See chapter vi.

the

the rules of criticiſm, and the examples of antiquity, as he finds thoſe rules and examples confirmed by nature and ſenſe, will readily diſtinguiſh the precepts of the Stagirite which are derived from thoſe unalterable ſources, and thoſe which are only founded on the peculiar ſtructure of the ancient drama. He will ſee, that, were our immortal Shakeſpear* to be tried before Ariſtotle himſelf, though that candid critic (for candid he is in the higheſt degree,) might find him, perhaps, guilty of breaking

* Unity of action is rigidly obſerved by Shakeſpear in his beſt plays, when compared with the generality of his cotemporary writers; and for uniformity of character he was never equalled.

ſome

ſome of the municipal ſtatutes of the Grecian ſtage, yet he would applaud him for the higher merit of ſtrictly obſerving thoſe ſuperior laws of general propriety and excellence, which are independent of local and temporal regulations, and which are implanted by the hand of nature in the imagination of the real poet, as the laws of morality and juſtice are in the heart of the virtuous man.

I have been inſenſibly led to ſay more on the merits of Ariſtotle than I intended, and, indeed, than was neceſſary; for, enlarging on the excellence of an author in a preface to his works, is, of all labors, the moſt

ſuperfluous, ſince few will peruſe the introduction, who are not on the point of judging for themſelves. Thoſe who now do it for the firſt time, may poſſibly think Dr. Harriſon, in Fielding's Amelia, not perfectly wrong, when he ſays he does not take Ariſtotle to be ſo great a blockhead as ſome do who have never read him.

2 AP 63

CON-

CONTENTS.

CHAP. I.

Of the nature of poetry, and the other imitative arts with which it is connected, in general; together with their differences.—Of the first difference; viz. the means by which they imitate - - page 1

CHAP. II.

Of the second difference.—The things imitated - - - 10

CHAP. III.

Of the third difference.—The manner of imitation.—Enquiry into the firſt invention of the drama - *page* 14

CHAP. IV.

Of the origin of poetry, and its diviſion into ſeveral ſpecies - - 18

CHAP. V.

Of comedy.—Difference between epic poetry and tragedy - - 27

CHAP. VI.

Of tragedy, and its parts - - 31

CHAP. VII.

Of the combination of the incidents - 43

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the fable - - - *page* 48

CHAP. IX.

Of the object of poetry, and how it differs from history - - 52

CHAP. X.

Of the different sorts of fable - 59

CHAP. XI.

Of the peripetia, discovery, and pathos - - - 61

CHAP. XII.

Of tragedy, divided into its constituent parts - - - 66

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Of what ought to be attempted in the arrangement of the fable.—And how the proper end of tragedy is to be attained - - page 69

CHAP. XIV.

How pity and terror are to be excited 76

CHAP. XV.

Of the manners - - - 85

CHAP. XVI.

Of the different ſpecies of diſcovery 95

CHAP. XVII.

Further obſervations on tragic poetry, and its compoſition - - 104

CHAP.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of the plot and its ſolution.—Of the office of the chorus - *page* 110

CHAP. XIX.

Of the ſentiment and language - 119

CHAP. XX.

Of the parts of language - 123

CHAP. XXI.

Of nouns or names - - 133

CHAP. XXII.

Of the excellence of language - 144

CHAP. XXIII.

Of epic poetry - - 155

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of the difference between the epopee and tragedy - *page* 161

CHAP. XXV.

Of objections, and how they may be answered - - 173

CHAP. XXVI.

Tragic imitation and epic compared. —Preference given to tragedy.— Conclusion - - - 194

2 AP 63

THE POETIC OF ARISTOTLE.

CHAP. I.

OF THE NATURE OF POETRY, AND THE OTHER IMITATIVE ARTS WITH WHICH IT IS CONNECTED, IN GENERAL; TOGETHER WITH THEIR DIFFERENCES.—OF THE FIRST DIFFERENCE; VIZ. THE MEANS BY WHICH THEY IMITATE.

I PROPOSE to treat of the Poetic Art itſelf, and its ſeveral ſpecies; of the power poſſeſſed by each, and how the fa-

bles ſhould be conſtructed that the poetry may have a beautiful arrangement; of the quality and number of its parts, and of other things belonging to the ſubject; beginning, according to the natural order, with its firſt principles.

The Epopee and Tragedy, and alſo Comedy and Dithyrambics, and the greateſt part of thoſe compoſitions which are ſet to the flute and the lyre, all agree in the general character of being imitations: but they are diſtinguiſhed from each other by three circumſtances; either by uſing means of imitation different in their kind, or by the difference of the things imitated, or by imitating in a different manner.

For

For as there are ſome artiſts, who, either through ſkill or practice, imitate many things by lines and colours, and others by the voice (1); ſo all the arts juſt mentioned effect an imitation by means of

(1) I ſee no reaſon for ſubſtituting δι' ἀμφοῖν, for διὰ τῆς φωνῆς, in this place, as is propoſed by Heinſius, Dacier, and Batteux: χρώμασι, σχήμασι, and φωνῇ, are the words oppoſed to ῥυθμῷ, λόγῳ, and ἁρμονίᾳ, and not διὰ τέχνης, and διὰ συνηθείας, as Batteux has ſuppoſed. "Les uns exécutent par certains pratiques de l'art, "les autres par l'habitude ſeul, quelquesuns par l'un "et l'autre enſemble; de même—l'imitation ſe fait "ou par un ſeul de ces moyens, (i. e. le rhythm, la "parole, et le chant,) ou par pluſieurs enſemble." But I do not ſee what oppoſition there can be between the manner by which a perſon acquires excellence in one art, and the means he uſes to effect an imitation in another. The imitation διὰ τῆς φωνῆς does not mean by words, but by ſounds, like the imitation of the finging of birds, or that effected by vocal muſic, when the artiſt tries to make the ſound "an echo to the ſenſe."

rhythm (2), of language, and of harmony; and theſe either ſeparate or mixed. Thoſe things, for example, which are ſet to the flute or the lyre, or any other inſtrument of the ſame powers, as the pipe, imitate by rhythm and harmony alone; while the dance imitates by rhythm only. independant of harmony; for the dance by its figured movements can imitate manners (3), paſſions, and actions. The Epopee uſes plain language or verſe, either mixing different meaſures, or confining

(2) By rhythm, is to be underſtood, cadence, time, or movement. Ῥυθμὸς, τάξις ἔμμελος ἀκολούθου ἁρμονίας. SUIDAS.

(3) Roſſi was an inſtance of this: in the dance of the Deſerter I have ſeen the ſpectators almoſt as much affected by her, as by the acting of Mrs. Siddons. This ſubject is well illuſtrated in a late ingenious pamphlet, entitled, Remarks on the favourite Ballet of Cupid and Pſyche.

fining itſelf to one ſort, as has continued the practice to the preſent time. (4)For elſe there would be no general name by which we could diſtinguiſh the Mimes of

(4) That is, unleſs all imitation by means of language only, as well in proſe, and verſe of different ſorts, as in hexameter verſe alone which is appropriated to the regular epic poem, can be comprehended under the general name of Epopee, there will be no common character under which ſuch compoſitions can be claſſed. That the word Ἐποποιϊα had this extenſive meaning, as well as the more limited ſenſe in which Ariſtotle afterwards uſes it, will appear from the authorities quoted by Heinſius, note 8, on this chapter, and from Batteux, and Harles, and Voſſius De Artis Poeticæ Naturâ, p. 279, ed. Rumbach. The Monthly Reviewer, in his criticiſm on Cooke's edition of the Poetic, is of opinion that οὐδὲν γὰρ is connected with πᾶσαι τυγχάνουσιν ὅσαι μιμήσεις τὸ σύνολον. But this will throw the principal ſubject of this chapter, and which is continued through the two ſucceeding ones, into a parentheſis. If this ſenſe is adopted, I would rather read, if it were not too bold an alteration, οὐδὲν γὰρ

of Sophron and Xenarchus, and the Socratic Dialogues, or even the imitations that might be made in trimeters, elegiac verſe, or other meaſures of the ſame ſort; except

ἂν ἔχωμεν ὀνομάσι κοινὸν ——— ΠΛΗΝ μίμησιν, οἱ ἀνθρωποί γε κ.τ.λ. conſidering ποῖοιτο as a verb neuter, as it is frequently uſed by Ariſtotle in this work.

Many of the commentators, among whom may be reckoned the celebrated Metaſtaſio, will not believe that proſe is meant by λογοῖς ψίλοις, but think the conjunction ἢ is not disjunctive, but explanatory; and ſo Goulſton, "ſermonibus nudis, ſive *appellare malumus* "metris." But, then, why ſhould Ariſtotle produce proſe examples? For whether the Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι mean the dialogues of Plato, or of Alexamenes the Teian, mentioned in a fragment of Ariſtot. de Poetis, quoted by Vittorio, and which were in verſe; it appears from a fragment of Ariſtotle quoted by Athenæus, from another of an anonymous writer preſerved by Montfaucon in his Bibliotheca Coiſliniana, and from Suidas, that the Mimes of Sophron were certainly in proſe. But though Ariſtotle, treating the ſubject philoſophically, is obliged to claſs theſe compoſitions

except indeed, that men, affixing the idea of poetry to verſification, call ſome elegiac and others epic poets, not as being poets from the imitation, but merely on account of the verſe. Nay, if they produce any thing in verſe on the arts of medicine, or muſic, they give them the ſame appellation; but Homer and Empedocles have nothing in common with each other

poſitions under the general name of Ἐποποιΐα, it is obvious he does not, as a critic, countenance any idea of a regular epic poem either in proſe or mixed verſe; ſince in chapter iv. he reckons the love of verſe equally with the love of imitation, as one of the natural cauſes of poetry, and in chapter xxiv. he mentions the heroic meaſure as ſolely calculated for the Epopee, and ſays it would be abſurd to uſe any other ſort, or a mixture of many, and produces the compoſition of Chæremon as an inſtance of ſuch abſurdity.

except the verſe; therefore, though one indeed may juſtly be ſtyled a poet, the other is rather a naturaliſt than a poet: and for the ſame reaſon, if a perſon ſhould form an imitation by mixing all kinds of verſe together, (like the Hippocentaur of Chæremon, which is a mixed rhapſody of all meaſures) he (5) may yet be eſteemed a poet. This is the proper diſtinction of theſe things.

There are ſome kinds of poetry that employ all the means that have been mentioned, viz. rhythm, melody, and verſe; as the Dithyrambics and the

(5) The words ἐκ ἤδη, which are judiciouſly omitted by Winſtanley on the authority of MSS. entirely deſtroy the ſenſe of this paſſage. Heinſius popoſes to remove the difficulty by a note of interrogation.

Nomi,

Nomi, and Tragedy alſo, and Comedy: and yet theſe differ from each other (6), ſome uſing them all at the ſame time, and others in ſeparate parts.

Theſe are the differences of the arts, as to the means by which the imitation is made.

(6) The Dithyrambics and Nomi uſe them all together, Tragedy and Comedy only in ſeparate parts; or as Ariſtotle explains it afterwards in chapter vi. τὸ διὰ μέτρων ἕνια μόνον περαίνεσθαι, καὶ πάλιν ἕτερα διὰ μέλους. For an account of the Nomi ſee chapter ii. note 2.

CHAP. II.

OF THE SECOND DIFFERENCE. — THE THINGS IMITATED.

SINCE perſons acting are the objects of poetical imitation, and thoſe perſons muſt neceſſarily be either good or bad; (for the manners almoſt conſtantly ariſe from theſe circumſtances alone, it being by virtue or vice that all mankind differ from each other as to their manners;) the perſons imitated muſt either be repreſented as better than thoſe of the preſent time, or worſe, or as they actually

ally (1) are. So among the painters, Polygnotus draws his figures better, Pauſo worſe, and Dionyſius as they are; and the ſame diſtinctions muſt evidently exiſt in each of the imitations that have been mentioned, and they differ from each other in imitating different things in this manner: for theſe varieties will be alſo obſerved in the dance, and in the compoſitions that are ſet to the flute and the lyre, and likewiſe in the Epopee which only uſes language or plain verſe; as, for example, Homer forms his characters better, and Cleophon as they are, but Hegemon the Thracian who firſt invented

(1) I follow Winſtanley in this whole paſſage, adding ἢ καὶ τοιούτος, which Batteux ſays is confirmed by a MS.

Parodies

Parodies, and Nicocharis who wrote the Deliad, makes them worſe. The ſame diſtinctions will be found in the Dithyrambics and Nomi (2); as, for inſtance, in the Perſians, and Cyclops, of Timotheus

(2) Though the printed editions in general read μίμως here, all the MSS. the edition of Aldus, and the old tranſlation of Valla, read νόμως, and it appears that Timotheus wrote a poem of that kind, called The Perſians, a line of which is quoted by Plutarch in his Life of Philopœmon. The Νόμος was a ſpecies of poem originally compoſed in honour of Apollo, and derived its name, not from νόμος, *lavv*, but from being ſung by ſhepherds ἐν νομοῖς (among the paſtures). The Dithyrambics were a ſort of looſe poem in honor of Bacchus; though the name was ſometimes uſed for lyric poetry in general. Διθυραμβοι λέγονται οἱ λυρικοὶ, ὡς ὁ Πινδαρος, καὶ ἁπλῶς οἱ πρὸς Διόνυσον ὕμνοι. Comm. MSS. in Ariſt. Rhet. jii. apud Cod. Laud. For a very particular account of the Nomi, ſee the Biſhop of Cheſter's learned and ingenious treatiſe De Decreto Lacedæmoniorum contra Timotheum Mileſium.

and

and Philoxenes. And in this lies the difference between Tragedy and Comedy; the one making its characters better, and the other worse, than those of the present time.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

OF THE THIRD DIFFERENCE.—THE MANNER OF IMITATION.—ENQUIRY INTO THE FIRST INVENTION OF THE DRAMA.

THE third difference comprehends the manner in which the imitation is made. For the objects may be the ſame, and the imitation performed by the ſame means, and yet (1) in a different manner; as, for inſtance, either like Homer, ſometimes by ſimple narration,

(1) The words ἑτέρως δὲ, which I have ſupplied, are wanting to make this paſſage clear.

and

and ſometimes by aſſuming a different character; or entirely by narration without aſſuming any character; or by introducing all the perſons imitated as agents and performers.

Theſe, as we ſaid at firſt, are the three differences of imitation, viz. the means by which it is performed, the thing imitated, and the manner how. So that in the objects of imitation, Sophocles is the ſame kind of imitator with Homer, for they both imitate perſons of dignity; and in the manner of imitation with Ariſtophanes, for they both effect it by agents (2) and performers.

(2) Undoubtedly δρῶντες and πραττοντες.

From

From the circumſtance of imitating by perſons acting, ſome ſay the name of Drama is derived; and on this account the Dorians claim the invention both of Tragedy and Comedy; (for the people of Megara claim the honor of Comedy; the natives, as being invented there during their democratical government, and thoſe who migrated from Sicily, becauſe the Poet Epicharmus floriſhed there long before the time of Chonnides and Magnes: while ſome of the Dorians of Peloponneſus claim the invention of Tragedy.) And they produce the names as a reaſon. For they ſay villages are by them called *comæ*, but that the Athenians call them *demi*; and

and that comedies(3) have not their name from *comazo*, to revel, but from their performers being baniſhed with diſgrace from cities, and obliged to wander from village to village; and they uſe the word *dran*(4) to ſignify *act*, or *perform*, but the Athenians uſe *prattein*.

And this is ſufficient as to the number, and quality, of the differences incident to imitation.

(3) Though the Dorians are ſaid to be the inventors of tragedy as well as comedy, the etymology of comedy only is given. Athenæus ſays the name of comedy was common to both dramas, as it is now in ſome degree among the French, and as we uſe the word comedian.

(4) Hence the word drama.

CHAP. IV.

OF THE ORIGIN OF POETRY, AND ITS DIVISION INTO SEVERAL SPECIES.

POETRY ſeems wholly to derive its origin from two cauſes, and thoſe founded on nature.

Imitation is congenial with man from his infancy. One of his characteriſtic diſtinctions from other animals is the being moſt addicted to it, acquiring his knowledge by it, and delighting in every ſpecies of it. A proof of this may be drawn from the works of art; where thoſe things which

which we view with pain in themſelves, we delight to ſee repreſented as accurately as poſſible; ſuch as the figures of the moſt ſavage wild beaſts, and of dead bodies. And the reaſon of this is, that to acquire knowledge is not only pleaſing to the lovers of ſcience, but to others alſo, though they partake it in a leſs degree. Now, the cauſe of the delight taken in viewing theſe repreſentations ariſes from reaſoning about the deſign of the artiſt, and diſcovering the likeneſs, which is in ſome degree acquiring knowledge. But when it happens that the object repreſented has never been ſeen before, the pleaſure is not derived from the imitation, but from the execution, the co-

loring, or ſome other cauſe of that kind.

The love of harmony and rhythm is equally natural to us with that of imitation, and verſe is evidently a ſpecies of rhythm. At firſt, therefore, thoſe who were by nature moſt addicted to theſe propenſities, improving by degrees, produced poems on extempore ſubjects; and poetry was divided according to the peculiar manners of the perſons who cultivated it. Thoſe who were of a more ſerious turn, imitated noble actions, and the fortunes of illuſtrious men; while thoſe of a more humble genius imitated the actions and fortunes of meaner perſons, firſt inſtituting ſatires, as the others had

had hymns to the gods, and encomiums on virtuous men.

We can aſcribe no poem of this ſort to any perſon earlier than Homer, though it is probable there were many. We muſt begin, therefore, from Homer, in whoſe Margites (1), and other compoſitions of the ſame nature, that kind of verſe was introduced which is now called Iambic, and which name was given it becauſe they uſed to ſatirize (*Iambizon*) each other in that ſort of meaſure. And

(1) A ſatirical poem written in various meaſures by Homer. The fragments of this poem which are printed in ſome editions of Homer, are allowed not to be genuine. Margites was not a real, but a fictitious name, derived from μάργης or μάργος, ſignifying *fooliſh, ignorant.*

this is the origin of the diviſion of the earlier poets into heroic and iambic.

As Homer, therefore, was the greateſt poet on ſerious ſubjects, ſtanding alone in point of excellence, not only from the goodneſs of his imitations, but from the dramatic form he gave them, ſo he alſo firſt taught the proper ſyſtem of comedy, forming the comic drama on general ridicule inſtead of perſonal invective; for the Margites has the ſame relation to comedy, that the Iliad and the Odyſſey have to tragedy. And ſucceeding poets, each purſuing that kind of poetry which was moſt agreeable to his natural genius, became writers of comedy inſtead of iambics, and tragedy inſtead of epic poetry;

the

the forms of theſe being more excellent and held in higher eſteem than the others.

To examine whether tragedy has acquired its perfect form, either judged by itſelf, or with regard to the repreſentation, is another matter; but both that and comedy, from being at firſt extempore productions, were augmented by ſlow degrees; one by the writers of dithyrambics, and the other by the writers of the phallics (2), which ſtill continue countenanced by the laws of ſome cities. And this proceſs will appear manifeſt on examining (3) them. Tragedy, after undergoing many changes, ſtopped when it

(2) A ſort of vulgar poem in honor of the rural deities.

(3) I follow Winſtanley, who propoſes to read αὐτοῖς for αὐτῆς.

had attained its natural form. Æſchylus firſt encreaſed the number of the actors from one to two, reduced the chorus, and added a fable for the principal (4) character. Sophocles introduced three actors and the painting of the ſcenes. Till at laſt, from trifling fable and ridiculous language, it attained gravity and dignity; and quitting the ſatyric (5) form, the

(4) Caſtelvetro, whom I have followed, propoſes to read πρωταγωνιστὴν, inſtead of πρωταγωνιστεῖν. Ariſtotle uſes λόγος as ſynonymous with μύθος, chap. v. Before Æſchylus there was no continued fable, nor any connexion between the ſtories forming the epiſodes or acts. Or perhaps it may allude to the giving a part or *rôle* to the principal perſon of the chorus.

(5) Satyric has no relation to ſatiric, or ſarcaſtic poetry, but was a kind of verſe adapted to the dance in which the Satyrs were ſuppoſed to take delight. This Virgil alludes to in his eclogue v.

"Saltantes Satyros imitabitur Alpheſibœus."

verſe

verſe became iambic inſtead of tetrameter. The tetrameter verſe was uſed firſt on account of the poetry being in the ſatyric form, and adapted to the dance: but when dialogue was introduced, Nature herſelf pointed out the proper meaſure; for of all verſe the iambic is moſt calculated for diſcourſe, ſince we frequently uſe iambic meaſure in common converſation, but hexameter very ſeldom, and only when we get above the uſual ſtyle of dialogue. After this the number of the acts (6) was encreaſed, and other ornaments added.

(6) The word Ἐπισόδιον here, and in ſome other parts of the Poetic, ſignifies the diviſion of the drama that we call an act. See its definition, chap. XII.

And

And this is ſufficient concerning theſe things in general. To inveſtigate each of them ſeparately would be a work of great length.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

OF COMEDY. — DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EPIC POETRY AND TRAGEDY.

COMEDY, as has already been obſerved, is an imitation of worſe(1) perſons; yet not ſuch as are bad with reſpect to general depravity, but in that particular ſpecies of turpitude which is calculated to excite ridicule. And this is either produced by miſtakes of judgment, that are

(1) That is, worſe than thoſe of the preſent time in general. See chap. ii.

not

not attended with dangerous or fatal conſequences; or by deformity of body, provided it is not occaſioned by pain.

The progreſs of tragedy and its authors is well known, but it is different with regard to comedy, from its being leſs cultivated at firſt. For it was not till late that the comic chorus was appointed by the magiſtrate, but it was performed by voluntary actors, till at length, having attained certain forms peculiar to itſelf, the writers of comedy were deemed worthy of remembrance. Nevertheleſs, it is ſtill unknown who introduced the maſks, the prologue, the number of actors, and other things of that kind. Epicharmus and Phormis commenced the practice of giving

ing a fable to comedy, the origin of which muſt therefore be derived from Sicily: for among the Athenians, Crates was the firſt who forſook perſonal ſatire, and introduced a general ſubject or fable.

The epopee agrees only with tragedy in uſing verſe, and imitating things of importance by means of language; but it differs from it in only uſing ſimple verſe, and being narrative; it alſo differs in regard to length, for tragedy endeavours if poſſible to confine itſelf to one courſe of the ſun, or only to exceed it a little; but the epopee is not limited as to its duration: and even tragedy, in its origin, had the ſame latitude as epic poetry.

As to the parts, ſome are common to both,

both, and ſome peculiar to tragedy. Whoever, therefore, can judge of a good or bad tragedy, may judge alſo of an epic poem: for whatever is eſſential to the epopee (2) may be found in tragedy, but many things belong to tragedy that are not in the epopee.

(2) Ariſtotle ſeems here to open thoſe ſentiments of the ſuperiority of tragedy, which he confirms in the concluding chapter.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

OF TRAGEDY, AND ITS PARTS.

LEAVING imitation in hexameter (1) verſe and comedy to be conſidered hereafter, we will now confine our enqui-

(1) That is epic poetry. From this definition of it, and from what Ariſtotle ſays in the preceding chapter, there can be no doubt that the French critics, when they bring what is ſaid on the epopee in the firſt chapter, as an authority from him for placing Fenelon by the ſide of Homer; and Segni and Florez, when they would claſs the tales of Boccace, and the romances of knight-errantry, with the regular epic poem; are much too ſanguine in favor of their countrymen.

ries

ries to tragedy, taking its definition from what has been already ſaid.

Tragedy, then, is an imitation of an important and complete action, poſſeſſing a certain degree of magnitude, in ornamented language, having its forms diſtinct in their reſpective parts, by the repreſentation of perſons acting, and not by narration,(2) effecting through the means of

(2) The conjunction ἀλλα, which is omitted in all the MSS. ſhould certainly not be inſerted, as no oppoſition between ἀπαγγελίας and ἐλέου καὶ φόβου can poſſibly be intended. See Winſtanley's note.

To enter into a full inveſtigation of the various opinions concerning this celebrated definition of tragedy, would exceed the propoſed extent of theſe notes. What Ariſtotle means by purging the paſſions, will be beſt explained by referring to his Politics, l. viii. ch. vii. where the ſame medical metaphor is applied to muſic: "Whatever" (he ſays) "affects any minds violently, "will

of pity and terror, the purgation of ſuch paſſions.

By language being ornamented, I mean accompanied by rhythm, harmony, and meaſure; and by the forms being diſtinct in their reſpective parts, that ſome parts attain their end by verſe only, and others have the aſſiſtance of muſic.

As

" will have ſome effect on all, and will only differ in " degree. Even thoſe who are very ſubject to en- " thuſiaſtic affections, when any of thoſe ſtrains of " grave and ſacred muſic are performed which are " calculated to touch the mind, are ſoothed and qui- " eted as if it were by medicine or purgation: and " the ſame will happen to thoſe who are very ſuſcep- " tible of the paſſions of pity or terror, or whoſe " paſſions in general are eaſily excited; they will " perceive a kind of purgation or unburthening of " the mind, accompanied with ſome degree of plea- " ſure." From this definition, and from the ſubjects propoſed by Ariſtotle as proper objects of tragic

As the imitation is performed by perſons acting; in the firſt place it will be a neceſſary conſequence that the decorations of the theatre muſt be conſidered as a principal part of tragedy, and then the muſic, and the language, for by them the imitation is effected. By language, I mean the compoſition of the verſe, and

imitation, ſee particularly chapter xiii. I think his notion of the end of tragedy to be the exciting the paſſions of pity and terror by imaginary ſcenes of diſtreſs, for the purpoſe of blunting or deadening their effects in real circumſtances; and not the laying down examples for the general conduct of life, by exhibiting the ill conſequences of carrying the paſſions to exceſs, as ſome have ingenuouſly imagined, and to which opinion I was, I own, ſtrongly inclined, till my preſent undertaking led me to examine the general tenor of Ariſtotle's reaſoning on the ſubject with greater attention. This doctrine is particularly illuſtrated by the late Mr. Harris, of Saliſbury, in his Treatiſe on Painting, Poetry, and Muſic.

by

by muſic, that which has a power ſufficiently manifeſt (3) to every one.

Secondly, as tragedy is the imitation of an action, which action is repreſented by agents, or perſons acting, whoſe qualities muſt be derived from manners and ſentiment, (for by theſe we pronounce on the qualities of actions;) manners and ſentiment muſt be two natural cauſes of our actions, from which all our ſucceſſes and diſappointments are derived. Even the fable itſelf is the imitation of an action. By the fable I mean the combination of the incidents; by the manners, that which enables us to decide on the

(3) I read with Heinſius πᾶσιν, inſtead of πᾶσαν.

characters of thoſe who act; and by the ſentiment, that by which the intention or opinion of thoſe who ſpeak may be diſcovered.

Every tragedy, therefore, has ſix parts, according to which its merit is decided on; viz. the apparatus of the theatre, the muſic, the fable, the manners, the language, and the ſentiment. And of theſe (4), two are the means by which the imitation is performed, one the mode of imitation, and the other three the things imitated. And beſides theſe there are no other parts; but theſe are in general uſe,

(4) The language and the muſic are the means of imitation. The apparatus, (including the actors, ὀψεως,) the mode of imitation. And the fable, manners, and ſentiment, the things imitated.

for

for apparatus, manners, fable, language, muſic, and ſentiment, are (5) equally eſſential to every tragedy.

But the principal of theſe parts is the combination of the incidents. For tragedy is not an imitation of particular perſons, but of actions in general, of human life, of good and ill fortune, for fortune depends upon action, and the end of tragedy is an action, and not a quality; and though the manners of men are de-

(5) Ariſtotle ſeems to contradict this aſſertion when he ſays, the next page, that a tragedy may exiſt without manners, though it cannot without action. Winſtanley propoſes to remove the οὐκ from before ὀλίγοις, and inſert it after ὄψιν, reading ὄψιν οὐκ ἔχει πᾶν κ. τ. λ. and making the ſenſe, "Few uſe all "theſe forms, for every drama does not equally excel "in apparatus, manners, &c."

rived from their qualities, their happineſs and miſery depend on their actions. Actions, therefore, are not repreſented for the purpoſe of imitating manners, but manners are comprehended at the ſame time by means of the action. Action and fable are the end of tragedy, and the end is the object to be principally conſidered in every thing. Tragedy cannot exiſt without action, but it may without manners, for moſt of the tragedies of the later writers are without manners; there being many who hold the ſame character among the poets that Zeuxis did with regard to Polygnotus among the painters: for Polygnotus was (6) excellent in expreſſing

(6) Αγαθὸς, MSS. which I think preferable to ἀγαθῶν.

manners,

manners, in which the pictures of Zeuxis were deficient. If a set of moral sentences should be put together with the language and sentiment well executed, it would by no means produce the effect of tragedy, which would be much rather obtained by a tragedy, that, possessing these in an inferior degree, had a fable, and combination of incidents. It must further be added, that the Peripetia, or sudden revolution of fortune, and the discovery, which are the principal causes of a tragedy being interesting, are parts of the fable. And, besides, those who first attempt to write dramatically, can sooner excel in the language, and the manners, than in combining the incidents,

as was the caſe of almoſt all the earlieſt poets.

The chief part, and, as it were, the ſoul of tragedy, is the fable, the manners holding but the ſecond place, and which may be eſteemed like the coloring of a picture; for the fineſt colors laid on promiſcuouſly will not pleaſe ſo much as a figure only in light and ſhade. In ſhort, the profeſſed end of tragedy is to imitate an action, and that (7) chiefly by means of perſonal agents.

Sentiment holds the third place, and its merit conſiſts in making the dialogue

(7) Heinſius having propoſed to read, inſtead of διὰ ταύτην μάλιστα τῶν πραττόντων,—διὰ ταύτης; I have ventured the further alteration of ταύτης μάλιστα διὰ τῶν πραττόντων, as giving the only clear ſenſe.

con-

conſonant with the fable and the characters. And this may be done either in the familiar or the rhetorical ſtyle, the (8) ancients uſing the former, and the moderns the latter. Manners may be defined, a manifeſtation of the intentions of the perſons acting. Therefore (9) thoſe pieces are deſtitute of characteriſtic manners, in which it is not manifeſt what the ſpeaker would chuſe, and what avoid. Sentiment is the actual declaration that a thing is ſo, or is not ſo, or is the aſſertion of ſome general propoſition.

(8) The ſame obſervation may be made on the Engliſh tragic writers; the ſtyles of Shakeſpear and Thomſon have exactly this difference.

(9) I have adopted the tranſpoſition propoſed by Winſtanley, and which Batteux ſays is confirmed by a MS. in the king of France's library.

The

The fourth requiſite is language. By language, I mean, as I ſaid before, the interpretation of our meaning by the uſe of words, and which has the ſame power both in verſe and proſe.

Of the remaining parts, the muſic holds the fifth place, and is indeed the chief of the ornamental parts; for the decorations of the ſtage, though the moſt intereſting, have the leaſt connexion with the poetic art. For the power of tragedy is independent of the performance and the actors, and in preparing the decorations the art of the manager of the theatre is more conſpicuous than that of the poet.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

OF THE COMBINATION OF THE INCIDENTS.

HAVING defined theſe things, we will proceed to conſider what is requiſite in the combination of the incidents, ſince that is the firſt, and principal part of Tragedy.

Tragedy, according to our poſition, is an imitation of a perfect, and entire action, poſſeſſing a certain degree of magnitude; for an action may be entire and yet want mag-

magnitude. What I mean by entire, is comprehending in itſelf a beginning, a middle, and an end. A beginning is that which does not itſelf neceſſarily follow any other event, but to which ſome other events may naturally ſucceed. An end is juſt the contrary, for it is that, which, either of neceſſity, or according to the general courſe of things, muſt follow ſome other event, but requires nothing after it. A middle requires other circumſtances both to precede and follow it. Fables, then, to be well conſtituted, ſhould not begin or end caſually, but ſhould agree with the ideas we have mentioned. As to magnitude, an animal, or any other thing that

that has conſtituent parts, to be beautiful, muſt not only have thoſe parts well connected, but ſhould alſo have a certain proper ſize, for beauty depends on ſize as well as ſymmetry; on which account no very ſmall animal can be beautiful, for the view being made in almoſt an imperceptible ſpace of time, will be confuſed: neither can a very large one, for as the whole view cannot be taken in at once, the unity and completeneſs that ſhould reſult from it will eſcape the ſpectator; ſuppoſe, for inſtance, an animal ten thouſand ſtadia in length. As, therefore, animals and other bodies ſhould have ſuch a ſize as may eaſily be comprehended in one view, ſo the dramatic fable ſhould have

ſuch

ſuch a length that the (1) connexion of the circumſtances may eaſily be remembered.

As to the length, as far as regards the time of the performance and the ſpectators, it has no relation to the poetic art. If, indeed, an hundred tragedies were to be acted ſucceſſively, they might be acted by the hour-glaſs, as they ſay was ſometimes formerly done. But as to the natural boundary of the drama, the greater it is the better, provided it be perſpicuous.

(1) I conceive this addition neceſſary to explain clearly the meaning of Ariſtotle. The moſt complicated and incoherent fable imaginable, if it were much ſhorter, might be more eaſily remembered than the ſtory of Œdipus as to the mere words, though the connexion of the circumſtances would be more difficultly retained.

In

In ſhort, to give the definition in ſimple terms, that is the proper boundary of the length, in which either neceſſarily or probably, according to the common order of things, the change of fortune from happineſs to miſery, or from miſery to happineſs, may be effected.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

OF THE FABLE.

THE unity of a fable does not depend on its relating to one perſon only, as ſome people imagine. For as out of the variety of accidents that may happen to one object, (1) ſome may have no connexion

(1) Τῶ γενὶ inſtead of τῶ γένει, Heinſius. Batteux tranſlates it: "Car de même que, de pluſieurs choſes "qui arrivent a un ſeul *homme*, on ne peut faire un "ſeul evenement; de même auſſi de pluſieurs actions "que fait un ſeul homme, on ne peut faire un ſeul "action."

nexion with each other; ſo there may be many actions of one man from which no ſingle uniform action can be deduced. From miſtaking this, the error of thoſe poets who wrote the Heracleid, the Theſeid, and other poems of that ſort, ſeems to have proceeded: for they imagined, as Hercules was one perſon, a fable that related only to him muſt conſequently poſſeſs the proper unity. Homer, as he was ſuperior in every thing elſe, appears, either from art or natural genius, to have had the moſt excellent idea of this; for

"action." But I rather chuſe to conſider τῷ ἐνὶ as of the neuter gender, otherwiſe there hardly ſeems a ſufficient diſtinction between the illuſtration, and the thing illuſtrated, poetical action comprehending what a perſon ſuffers as well as performs.

in compoſing the Odyſſey he did not comprehend all that happened to Ulyſſes, as his being wounded (2) on Parnaſſus, or feigning madneſs at the aſſembling of the army, between which events there was no neceſſary or probable connexion; but he confined the Odyſſey, and the Iliad likewiſe, to one action.

As, therefore, in the other imitative arts, the imitation is ſingle when one object is imitated, ſo a dramatic fable has

(2) It muſt be obſerved that Homer does mention this circumſtance in the Odyſſey, l. xix. and from the ſcar he is diſcovered by Euryclea; on which account Harles, in his edition of the Poetic, corrects the paſſage thus: οἷον πληγῆναι μὲν ἐν τῷ Παρνασσῷ, ΟΥΔΕ μανῆναι προσποιήσαθαι ἐν τῷ ἀγιερμῷ. "The wound, indeed, "becauſe it had relation to the circumſtances of the "fable; but not his feigning madneſs, becauſe it had "no connexion with it."

unity

unity if it imitates one complete action, the parts of which are ſo conſtituted, that any of them being either altered or taken away, would change and confuſe the whole. For that can never be eſteemed a part of any thing which makes no ſenſible difference whether it is there or not

CHAP. IX.

OF THE OBJECT OF POETRY, AND HOW IT DIFFERS FROM HISTORY.

IT appears from what has been ſaid, that the object of the poet is not to relate what has actually happened, but what may poſſibly happen, either with probability, or from neceſſity. The difference between the poet and the hiſtorian does not ariſe from one writing in verſe, and the other in proſe; for if the work of Herodotus were put into verſe, it would be

no

no leſs a hiſtory than it is in proſe. But they differ in this, that one relates what has actually been done, the other what may be done. Poetry, therefore, is more philoſophical and inſtructive than hiſtory. Poetry ſpeaks more of general things, and hiſtory of particular. By general things, I mean what any perſon of ſuch a character would probably and naturally ſay or do in ſuch a ſituation; and this is what poetry aims at even (1) in giving names to the characters. By particular things I mean what any individual, as Alcibiades for inſtance, either acted or ſuffered in

(1) For inſtance, calling a faithful ſervant Parmeno, and a ſoldier Thraſo, or Politon. This is generally the caſe in the modern drama, with the ſame exception as to tragedy.

reality. And this is now conſpicuous in comedy, where the poets (not like the writers of ſatirical pieces, who introduce perſonal characters,) firſt form their fable, and then add any caſual names; whereas in tragedy the names of perſons who have really exiſted are retained. And this is done becauſe we give credit to things which we know to be poſſible; now, events which have never happened we can hardly believe to be poſſible, but what has actually happened is evidently poſſible, for had it been impoſſible it could not have happened. Nevertheleſs, in ſome tragedies, there are only a few known names, and the reſt are fictitious, and in others there are none; as in the Anthos

of

of Agatho, which does not fail to afford pleaſure, though the incidents and characters are equally feigned. It need not, therefore, be an invariable rule to adhere to the received fables on which tragedies are written; and, indeed, it would be ridiculous to endeavour ſcrupulouſly to do it, ſince thoſe fables that are known, are known only to a few, and yet give equal delight to all.

From theſe things, it is clear that the character of poet (2) is rather derived from the compoſition of the fable, than

(2) The Engliſh reader muſt be informed, that poet, in the original, ſignifies maker; which word is uſed for poet in a book entitled, The Art of Engliſh Poeſie, printed in 1589, and quoted by Warton in his obſervations on Spencer, vol. i. p. 52.

the verſe, becauſe the imitation conſtitutes the poet, which imitation muſt be of an action. Even if he writes on real actions, he may yet be a poet, ſince there is no reaſon why many real facts may not be capable of that general probability and poſſibility, in regard to which he may juſtly be eſteemed a poet.

Of ſimple fables and actions, the epiſodic are the worſt. I call a fable (3) epiſodic, when the acts follow each other without probability or neceſſity. Theſe are made by bad poets from their own want of genius, and by good ones to pleaſe the performers; for conſidering only the repreſentation, and extending

(3) See chapter iv. note 6.

the

the action beyond its proper length, they are often forced to violate the connexion of the fable.

As the imitation ſhould not only be of a perfect action, but likewiſe of one calculated to produce pity and fear; and as thoſe objects will be principally attained if the events ariſe from each other, and eſpecially (4) if they fall out contrary to expectation; (for by that means ſurprize will be more ſtrongly excited than if they ſeemed to happen by accident, becauſe, even among accidental things, thoſe are moſt ſurprizing that have

(4) I follow the reading propoſed by Winſtanley, ταῦτα δὲ γίνεται τοιαῦτα ὅταν γίνηται δι' ἄλληλα, ἢ μᾶλλον ὅταν γίνηται παρὰ τὴν δόξαν.

the

the appearance of deſign, as the inſtance of the ſtatue of Mityus in Argos falling down, and killing his murderer while he was looking at it, for ſuch events do not ſeem merely caſual,) fables of this kind(5) muſt be the moſt beautiful.

(5) I. e. where the events ariſe from each other contrary to expectation. ὥστε ſhould be omitted, as otherwiſe there will be nothing to anſwer to ἐπὶ δὲ at the beginning of this paragraph, which is all one ſentence.

CHAP. X.

OF THE DIFFERENT SORTS OF FABLE.

FABLES are either ſimple or complex, for ſo are thoſe actions of which fables are an imitation. I call that a ſimple action, which, being (as has heen defined,) connected (1) and uniform, has the tranſition of fortune without peripetia,(2) or diſcovery: and that a complex

(1) Συνεχὴς. Continuous, not epiſodic.

(2) Περιπέτεια. An unexpected revolution of fortune. I have retained the word in the tranſlation, as it is naturalized in the language of dramatic criticiſm.

action,

action, where the tranſition is effected by the means of peripetia, or diſcovery, or both. Theſe ſhould ariſe out of the fable itſelf, and appear the neceſſary or probable conſequence of what has happened before: for there is a wide difference between one event happening in conſequence of another, or only following it.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

OF THE PERIPETIA, DISCOVERY, AND PATHOS.

THE peripetia, as has already been defined, is a ſudden revolution of fortune in the perſons acting, neceſſarily or probably ariſing from the incidents. As in the Œdipus, a perſon coming with the idea of conſoling that prince, and removing his apprehenſions about his mother by diſcovering who he really is, produces the contrary effect. And in the tragedy of Lyn-

Lynceus, he being led out to die, and Danaus following to kill him, it happens, from the courſe of the action, that Danaus is ſlain, and Lynceus preſerved.

The diſcovery, as the name implies, is a tranſition from ignorance to knowledge, producing either friendſhip, or hatred, as the perſons are deſigned for happineſs, or diſtreſs. The diſcovery is moſt beautiful when accompanied by the peripetia, as in the tragedy of Œdipus; though there are other ſorts of diſcovery, for it may ariſe from accidental, or inanimate things, or a perſon may be diſcovered by performing or omitting ſome particular act; but that I firſt mentioned has moſt connexion with the fable and the action;

and

and ſuch a diſcovery and peripetia will produce that pity and terror, of which tragedy is defined to be an imitation, as from this the happineſs or miſery of the characters will ariſe.

As the diſcovery is a diſcovery of certain perſons, it will ſometimes happen that one perſon only need be diſcovered to the other, the other being already ſufficiently known; and ſometimes both muſt be diſcovered. As in the tragedy of Iphigenia, where ſhe is known to Oreſtes by ſending a letter, but another method is neceſſary to diſcover him to Iphigenia.

To theſe two parts of tragedy, peripetia, and diſcovery, muſt be added a third,

third, viz. pathos (1). The pathos is that part of the action which is either fatal or painful; ſuch as deaths (2) exhibited

(1) The word πάθος here ſignifies real corporal ſuffering, and not the idea we uſually annex to pathos: and in this ſenſe I conceive Ariſtotle calls the Iliad pathetic, chap. xxiv.

(2) Cooke has been at great pains to explain away the meaning of ἐν τῷ φανερῷ, as ſuppoſing this paſſage to militate againſt the rule of Horace,

"Nec pueros coram populo Medea trucidet."

But it ſeems to me to be without neceſſity. That diſlike to ſuch repreſentations which is ſo rooted in the French theatre, did not, I think, originate in the theatre of Greece, or the rules of Ariſtotle, and his copier Horace. It is the improbability, not the cruelty, that Horace objects to. "*Incredulus* "odi." I do not conceive "coram populo" to allude to the ſpectators, but the chorus. This will be illuſtrated, by obſerving the different management of Euripides, and Seneca, who it is likely would

bited on the ſtage, or tortures, or wounds, or other things of that nature.

would hardly have violated this rule of Horace in the very inſtance mentioned by him, if he had not copied it from ſome Greek tragedy, or that of Ennius, which it is poſſible Horace might mean to cenſure. In Euripides, Medea kills her children behind the ſcenes, and the chief perſon of the chorus naturally exclaims,

Παρέλθω δόμους, ἀρῆξαι φόνον
Δοκεῖ μοὶ τέκνοις.——

"The houſe I'll enter, and attempt to ſave
"The children from deſtruction."——

On the contrary, in Seneca, Medea kills one of her children in the preſence of the chorus, without their making any obſervations on it; and, on Jaſon entering, ſhe ſnatches the other up into her chariot, and deliberately murders it in the face of the chorus, and all the ſurviving perſons of the drama. Of ſuch an arrangement, the critic may well ſay

"Quodcunque oſtendis mihi *ſic incredulus* odi."

CHAP. XII.

OF TRAGEDY, DIVIDED INTO ITS CONSTITUENT PARTS.

HAVING mentioned the parts of tragedy that ought to be uſed as general forms, we now come to the conſtituent parts into which it is particularly divided; which are the prologue, the epiſodes, or acts, the exode, and the chorus; and this laſt is again divided into the parode, and ſtaſimon, which are common to all tragedies, and the commi, or the lamentations of the chorus with thoſe on the

the ſtage, which are peculiar only to ſome.

The prologue is that entire part of the tragedy which precedes the parode or firſt entrance of the chorus.

The epiſode (1), or act, comprehends thoſe entire parts of the tragedy that are between all the odes of the chorus.

The exode is all that part of the tragedy which ſucceeds the laſt ode of the chorus.

(1) See chapter iv. note 6. When the chorus was conſidered as the chief part of the drama, the fables which were introduced between the diviſions of the chorus were called epiſodes, which name they retained after Æſchylus had reduced the chorus, and the fable became the moſt conſiderable part of the drama.—COOKE.

Of the choric part, the parode is the firſt ſpeech of the full chorus, the ſtaſimon is the ſong of the chorus without anapæſts or trochees, and the commus is the joint lamentation of the chorus and thoſe on the ſtage.

Theſe are the conſtituent parts into which tragedy is particularly divided. Thoſe which it ought to uſe as general forms, have been mentioned before.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

OF WHAT OUGHT TO BE ATTEMPTED IN THE ARRANGEMENT OF THE FABLE. AND HOW THE PROPER END OF TRAGEDY IS TO BE ATTAINED.

AFTER what has been already ſaid, we now regularly proceed to ſhew what ought to be attempted, and what avoided in conſtructing the fable, and from whence the proper end of tragedy ſhould be derived.

As the compoſition of the moſt beau-

tiful tragedies ſhould not be ſimple, but complex, and ſhould imitate an action capable of exciting pity and terror, (that being peculiar to this kind (1) of imitation,) it is evident that thoſe who are repreſented as falling from happineſs to miſery, ſhould not be perſons of extraordinary virtue, as that would excite diſguſt, rather than pity or terror. Neither ſhould wicked men be ſhewn as riſing from miſery to happineſs, for that would be directly oppoſite to the deſign of tragedy, not poſſeſſing any one of its requiſites, being neither agreeable to our feelings,

(1) I. e. the complex tragedy, poſſeſſing diſcovery, and perepetia. So chapter xi. ἡ γὰρ τοιαυτη ἀγνώϊσις καὶ περιπέτια, ἢ ἔλεον ἕξει ἢ φόβον.

nor

nor exciting either pity or terror. Neither ſhould a very wicked perſon be repreſented as falling from happineſs to miſery; for though ſuch an arrangement might be agreeable to our feelings, it would excite neither pity nor terror; for one of theſe paſſions is excited by the misfortunes of an innocent (2) perſon, the other by the misfortunes of a perſon in the ſame ſituation with ourſelves, pity, on

(2) Intentionally innocent in regard to the crime or misfortune for which he ſuffers, as was the caſe with Œdipus. By equality, is not meant equality of ſituation in life, but in virtue or vice. A private Athenian citizen might conceive himſelf in the ſame ſituation, as a ſon, with Œdipus, though a monarch; but we are little intereſted by characters of conſummate goodneſs, or conſummate villainy, as we can hardly bring their ſituation home to our own boſoms.

account of the diſtreſs being undeſerved, and terror from the equality; ſuch an event would, therefore, be neither terrible nor alarming. The character that remains, is the medium between theſe: a man neither eminently conſpicuous for virtue and juſtice, nor reduced to miſery by wickedneſs and villainy; but rather one in high reputation and proſperity, ſuffering through ſome error, like Œdipus and Thyeſtes, and other illuſtrious men of ſuch families.

A fable properly conſtructed ſhould rather be ſimple (3) than double, (though

(3) At firſt ſight, Ariſtotle ſeems to contradict his preceding aſſertion; ſee note 1. on this chapter: but here ἁπλόος is oppoſed to διπλόος, and there to πεπλεγμένος.

the

the latter is preferred by ſome,) and the change ſhould not be from miſery to happineſs, but, on the contrary, from happineſs to miſery, not on account of wickedneſs, but from ſome great error: and it ſhould happen to ſome ſuch perſon as has been mentioned, or to a better character, rather than a worſe. And this is confirmed by experience; for formerly the poets took any caſual fables without conſideration(4), but now the ſubjects of the

(4) Heinſius propoſes to change the word ἀπηρίθμων, which ſtands in the text, for ἀπειρρύθμων. But the common reading is defended by Winſtanley, the word ἀπαριθμέω ſometimes conveying the idea of raſhneſs or inconſideration; as in Iſocrates, ὅταν ἀναγινώσκῃ τις τὸν λόγον, ἀπίθανως καὶ μηδὲν ἦθος σημηνάμενος, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἀπαρίθμων.

beſt

beſt tragedies are taken from a few families, as thoſe of Alcmæon, of Œdipus, of Meleager, of Thyeſtes, of Telephus, and of ſuch others as have either acted or ſuffered any thing terrible.

This being the moſt perfect form of tragedy, according to the principles of the art, thoſe who blame Euripides becauſe he purſues this method, and makes his tragedies end with diſtreſs, are themſelves wrong, that ſyſtem being proved right; the greateſt mark of which is, that ſuch dramas appear moſt tragical in the performance, if they are well managed; and Euripides, if he does not contrive ſo well in other circumſtances, is allowed to be the moſt tragical of our poets.

The

The other form, which is preferred by ſome, is that which has a double compoſition, like the Odyſſey, having a different cataſtrophe for the virtuous and vicious. The reaſon why this form is ſometimes preferred, ariſes from the weakneſs of the ſpectators, which the poets are induced to follow, and compoſe their plays to gratify the feelings of the audience. But the ſatisfaction attained by theſe means, is not that which ſhould properly be expected from tragedy, but rather what belongs to comedy, where, though the characters ſhould, according to the fable, be as implacable enemies as Oreſtes and Ægiſthus, they muſt go out reconciled at the end of the play, and no perſon muſt be killed by another.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIV.

HOW PITY AND TERROR ARE TO BE EXCITED.

PITY and terror may either be cauſed by the repreſentation, or produced by the combination of the incidents; but the laſt is preferable, and ſhews ſuperior ſkill in the poet. For the fable ought to be ſo conſtituted, that a perſon only hearing the incidents related, ſhould both ſhudder and be affected with compaſſion, as would be the conſequence if the ſtory of Œdipus were related. But to effect this

this by means of the repreſentation only, is very unſkilful, and rather the buſineſs of the manager of the theatre. Thoſe who excite horror, (1) inſtead of terror, by the repreſentation, have none of the properties of tragedy; for every ſort of entertainment ſhould not be ſought from it, but only that which is peculiar to it. Since then it is the buſineſs of the tragic poet to afford that entertainment from his imitation, which may ariſe from the paſſions of pity and terror, it is evident this ought to be effected by the actions

(1) As in the Eumenidæ of Æſchylus, where ſuch a number of furies in horrid forms were introduced, that the whole audience were terrified, children died of the fright, and pregnant women miſcarried.

them-

themſelves. We will conſider, therefore, what circumſtances will appear dreadful and lamentable. Actions of this ſort, muſt either happen between friends, or enemies, or indifferent perſons. Now, if one enemy kills another, no pity is excited, either while the action is performed, or meditated, except what ariſes from the ſuffering of the perſon. It is the ſame between thoſe who are indifferent to each other. Such ſtories, then, ſhould be ſought after where the misfortune happens between thoſe who are dear to each other; as when a brother kills, or attempts to kill, or otherwiſe injures a brother, a ſon his father, a mother her ſon, or a ſon his mother.

It is by no means allowable to deviate from received ſtories; ſuch, I mean, as Clytemneſtra being killed by Oreſtes, and Eriphyle by Alcmæon. But it is the poet's office to invent fables himſelf, and arrange the circumſtances of thoſe already received, with propriety. I will explain more clearly what I mean by propriety of arrangement.

Actions may either be repreſented according to the practice of the ancients, as performed by perſons knowing what they are about, like Medea deſtroying her children in the tragedy of Euripides; or ſome dreadful deed may be acted by a perſon not knowing what he does, and the relation and friendſhip of the characters

may

may be diſcovered afterwards; either as in the Œdipus of Sophocles, where the action is performed prior to the opening of the drama; or it may be comprized in the tragedy itſelf, as in the Alcmæon of Aſtydamus, and the character of Telegonus in the Ulyſſes Wounded. A third method may be added to theſe, viz. for a perſon to be near committing ſome ſhocking action through ignorance, and to make the diſcovery before he does it. And there is no other method except theſe, for a perſon muſt either act, or not act, and muſt either know what he does, or not know what he does; but of theſe forms, a perſon going to act, knowing what he is about to do, and then not acting,

ing, is ſo much the worſt, (being odious from the wickedneſs of the intention, and not tragical as no one ſuffers,) that none have written in this way, a very few inſtances excepted, as, for example, Hæmon with regard to Creon, in the tragedy of Antigone. That where the deed is actually performed, is not ſo bad. It is ſtill better when the deed is performed ignorantly, and the diſcovery made afterwards; for there will be no wicked intention, and the diſcovery will be very affecting. But the laſt method is the beſt (2), as in the tragedy of Creſphontes,

(2) Though Batteux ſays in his remarks, "Nous "avons dit la meilleure des quatres, parce qu'A- "riſtotle propoſe quatre, quoiqu'il ſemble n'en

tes, where Merope, being on the point of killing her ſon, diſcovers who he is, and ſaves his life; and, in the ſame manner, in the tragedy of Iphigenia, the ſiſter diſcovers her brother, and, in the tragedy of Helle,

" propoſer que trois," yet Ariſtotle actually mentions the four, and gives examples of them all, though he ſays one is too bad to be admitted. Η γαὲ πρᾶξαι ἀναγκη ἢ μὴ, καὶ εἰδότας, ἢ μὴ εἰδότας. Here the four forms are expreſsly mentioned: πρᾶξαι εἰδότας, to act knowingly, like Medea in killing her children; μὴ πρᾶξαι εἰδότας, knowing what one is about to do, not to act, like Hæmon, in his attempt to kill his father Creon; πρᾶξαι, μὴ εἰδότας, to act ignorantly, as in the Œdipus of Sophocles; μὴ πρᾶξαι, μὴ εἰδότας, not to act, though the conſequence of the action is unknown; that is, to be about to act through ignorance of the relation of the perſon who is the object of the action, and to make the diſcovery in time, as in the caſe of Merope,

Helle, the ſon knows his mother juſt as he is going to deliver her up.

And this is the reaſon, as we obſerved before, why there are not many families that furniſh proper ſubjects for tragedy.

For

rope, of Iphigenia, and of Helle. Does not Ariſtotle, by preferring this laſt arrangement, here ſeem to contradict the preference he gave in the laſt chapter to thoſe tragedies that end unhappily? Batteux tries to vindicate him, by ſuppoſing he does not mean the beſt poſſible manner, but the beſt of theſe four ſpecies. But Ariſtotle expreſsly ſays there is no other form; and Batteux admits, that the undertaking an action unknowingly, and making the diſcovery after its completion, is the caſe of Oraſmin in the Zaire of Voltaire: and he might have added, of the Œdipus of Sophocles, which is of that form before commended by Ariſtotle, as ending in diſtreſs, and from which he draws moſt of his examples, as being the criterion of a perfect

For it was not from art, but accident, that the firſt poets learned to form their fables on ſuch circumſtances, and they were obliged to have recourſe to thoſe families in which ſuch misfortunes happened.

And this is ſufficient concerning the combination of the incidents, and the neceſſary qualities of the fable.

drama. Cooke defends him by ſuppoſing κρείττων not to mean the beſt, but the moſt faſhionable, "ὁ κρείττων ὁ νικᾶ has the vogue." If κρείττων may be received here in this ſenſe, it will agree with Ariſtotle's obſervation in chapter xiii. that poets form ſuch tragedies to gratify the feelings of the ſpectators; διὰ τῶν θεάτρων ἀσθένειαν. Of which paſſage, I ſhall obſerve there is no reaſon for changing θεάτρων for θεατῶν, as propoſed by Madius: Ariſtotle uſing θεατρον for ſpectators. See chapter xvi. note 11 and 12.

CHAP.

CHAP. XV.

OF THE MANNERS.

IN forming the manners, four things are to be attended to. The firſt, and moſt eſſential of which, is, that they ſhould be good. We have obſerved before, that there will be manners in a poem, when any propenſity is diſcovered, either by the dialogue, or the action. If that propenſity is bad, the manners will be bad, and if good, they will be good, and that in every condition of life. A woman or

a ſlave may be good, though it is probable that a woman (1) ſhould be worſe than a man, and that a ſlave ſhould be entirely bad.

Secondly, they ſhould be in character. To be manly and formidable, is becom-

(1) Though this opinion of Ariſtotle may appear unfavourable to the ladies, it muſt be remembered that the women of Greece were little better than in a ſtate of confinement and ſervitude, and conſequently, as cuſtom and education may be ſaid to form the character, their manners muſt have been little ſuperior to thoſe of ſlaves. Had Ariſtotle lived among the women of modern Europe, whoſe education and mode of life give them every virtue in common with men, that becomes their ſex, without their licentiouſneſs, the Grecian philoſopher, perhaps, had agreed with the polite St. Evremond, in thinking that a perfect character might be found more eaſily among women than men.

ing

ing in a man, but would be improper in a woman.

Thirdly, they ſhould be like (2). There is a diſtinction between this, and what we have already mentioned of their being good, and in character.

And fourthly, they ſhould be conſiſtent. For, even if an inconſiſtent perſon is drawn, the character ſo imitated ſhould be conſiſtently (3) inconſiſtent.

An

(2) The diſtinction between τὸ ὅμοιον, and τὸ ἀρμόττον, lies in the one relating to manners in general, and the other to the manners of particular perſons, as Achilles, Ulyſſes, &c. which ſhould be drawn according to the received opinion. So Horace: Aut famam ſequere (τὸ ὅμοιον), aut convenientia finge (τὸ ἀρμόττον).

(3) The character of an inconſiſtent perſon, like that of Tigellius, in Horace, ſhould be kept up

An example of bad manners, unneceſſarily introduced, may be ſeen in the character of Menelaus, in the tragedy of Oreſtes; of manners improper, and out of character, in the lamentation of Ulyſſes,

throughout, and not made to act conſiſtently in ſome inſtances, and inconſiſtently in others. With the utmoſt deference for his elegant taſte, and critical abilities, I cannot but think the biſhop of Worceſter has refined too much in his ideas of this paſſage. He thinks Ariſtotle means that an inconſiſtent perſon, like Electra or Iphigenia, may be ſo managed by the poet, as to have the irregularity made conſiſtent with the baſis or foundation of the character; and this he endeavours to prove Euripides has done, not only in Electra, but in Iphigenia, the very character Ariſtotle produces as a blameable inſtance of inconſiſtency. I am not ſo bigoted to the author I am tranſlating, as to ſuppoſe him always infallible, and it is very poſſible the biſhop of Worceſter may not

ſes, in the tragedy of Scylla, and in the ſpeech of Menalippe; and of inconſiſtent manners, in the tragedy of Iphigenia in Aulis, where there is no reſemblance between her ſupplication, and her ſubſequent behaviour.

Neceſſity and probability ſhould be as much conſidered in the manners, as in

not be wrong in his defence of Iphigenia's conſiſtency of character. But to bring the very character quoted by Ariſtotle, as violating a general rule, to illuſtrate on Ariſtotle's own principles an exception to that general rule, and that, by changing the words defining ſuch exception from their received and obvious meaning, can hardly be juſtified by the laws of ſober criticiſm. An inconſiſtent perſon, rendered conſiſtent with the baſis of his character, would not have been called ὁμαλῶς ἀνόμαλος, but ἀμετρίοντως ἀνόμαλος.

the

the action. And it is as material to enquire whether it is neceſſary or probable for ſuch a man to ſay or do ſuch things, as whether it is neceſſary or probable for ſuch an event to follow another.

It (4) is evident, therefore, that the unravelling of the plot ſhould ariſe from the fable itſelf, and not from a machine, as in the return of the Greeks in the Iliad (5). Machinery is moſt properly employed

(4) I do not ſee the connexion of this paragraph with the reſt of the chapter. It ſeems rather to belong to chapter xviii.

(5) Caſtelvetro ſuppoſes this to allude to the Iliad, l. ii. where Minerva, by the advice of Juno, perſuades Ulyſſes to prevent the return of the Greeks, to which they were induced by the ſpeech of

ployed in thoſe circumſtances that are out of the drama; either for the purpoſe of diſcovering ſuch things as have happened before, which it is impoſſible for human knowledge to find out, or future events, which muſt require prophecy, and ſupernatural intelligence; for the gods are ſuppoſed to know every thing. It is wrong to admit any circumſtance that is contrary to reaſon among the incidents; but if any ſhould be admitted, it ought to be out of the tragedy, as in the Œdipus of Sophocles.

As tragedy is an imitation of perſons

of Agamemnon. But it poſſibly may relate to the leſſer Iliad, or ſome tragedy formed from it. See the end of chapter xxiii.

better

better than thoſe of the preſent time, the example of good portrait painters ſhould be followed, who make their pictures more beautiful than the life, and yet preſerve the likeneſs. A poet, therefore, who imitates paſſionate or effeminate (6) perſons,

(6) Ῥαθύμως. Dacier propoſes to render this word wrathful, or indignant. But I ſhould hardly think this juſtifiable on the ſole authority of Heſychius, who, after giving the uſual interpretation, adds, ἄλλοι, ἐπὶ τῦ μεγάλῳ θυμῷ κέχρηνται τῇ λέξει· "Others uſe the word to expreſs greatneſs of ſpirit." Terraſon ſur l'Iliad, ſays, "Ces paroles "ont fort tourmentés les commentateurs, mais "pour un paſſage d'Ariſtotle je le trouve aſſez "clair, et je le traduis ainſi. Il faut bien qu'un "poëte qui veut repreſenter un homme coleré, "s'en tienne a l'idée de la ſeverité, et que voulant "peindre un homme môu il lui donne les traits de "la

perſons, or other characters of that kind, ſhould repreſent them as examples of mildneſs and ſeverity. So Achilles is drawn as a good character by Homer.

Theſe rules ought to be obſerved, and not only theſe, but ſuch alſo as regard thoſe

" la douceur, et ainſi des autres charactères ; c'eſt " de cette manière qu' Homère a rendu Achille " bon. J'oppoſe σκληρότητος ſeverité, à ὀργίλους em- " portés, et ἐπιεικείας douceur, à ῥαθύμους, qui ſig- " nifie moûs, quoique ὀργίλους ſoit mit avant ῥαθύμως " dans le premier membre de la phraſe, et ἐπιει- " κείας avant σκληρότητος dans le ſecond ; c'eſt un " renverſement d'ordre dont on voit bien des ex- " emples." I have no doubt of this being the right interpretation, and have accordingly adopted it. As to the alteration of reading ἀγάθον inſtead of ἀγάθων, it is perfectly conformable with the firſt condition, viz. that the manners ſhould be χρηστὰ, morally

thoſe objects of the other ſenſes, that neceſſarily accompany dramatic poetry; for errors will often happen with reſpect to them. But theſe are ſufficiently ſpoken of in treatiſes already publiſhed.

morally good. The MS. in the library at Wolfenbuttel, the edition of Aldus, and both thoſe of Baſil, read ἀγάθον. Ariſtotle confirms this in his Rhetoric, l. i. where he ſays, "Thoſe are good, "who are eſteemed ſo by good perſons, as Ulyſſes "by Minerva, and Achilles by Homer."

CHAP. XVI.

OF THE DIFFERENT SPECIES OF DISCOVERY.

THE diſcovery having been defined, we will now diſtinguiſh its different forms.

The firſt, which is the leaſt artful, and which the generality of poets uſe for want of genius, is that by tokens. Of theſe, ſome are natural, like the ſpear which was borne by the Gegenes (1), and the

(1) Deſcendants of the earth. The name of a Theban family, ſuppoſed to be the offspring of the ſerpent's teeth ſown by Cadmus.

ſtars

ſtars (2) on the body of Thyeſtes, in the tragedy written by Carcinus; and others are adventitious, either on the body as ſcars, or independent of it as jewels, or like the cradle in the tragedy of Tyro. But theſe may be uſed with greater or leſs propriety. As, for example, Ulyſſes is diſcovered by means of a ſcar; but in a different manner to Euryclea (3) and the ſwine herds: now, where they are ſhewn purpoſely to gain credit, as in the

(2) For ὑστέρας, Robertellus propoſes to read ὀστέα, bones, as alluding to the ivory ſhoulder of Pelops, which Tzetzes ſays became a diſtinguiſhing mark to the Pelopidæ, as the ſpear was to the Sparti, i. e. the deſcendants of the ſown teeth.

(3) The two diſcoveries mentioned, are in the Odyſſey, books xix. and xxi.

laſt

laſt inſtance, they are very inartificial; but when the diſcovery is accidental, like that made to Euryclea, it has more merit.

The ſecond are thoſe which are invented by the poet, and are therefore (4) inartificial. Thus Oreſtes, in the Iphigenia, diſcovers his ſiſter by means of a letter, but is known to (5) her, not from any circumſtance ariſing from the fable, but from ſaying what the poet choſe to put in his mouth; therefore this borders on the

(4) The οὐκ before ἄτεχνοι is omitted in moſt of the MSS. and oldeſt editions.

(5) I follow Vittorio in omitting διὰ σημείων, ταῦτα δ'. For the embroidery and the ſpear introduced by Euripides do not occaſion the diſcovery, but are only mentioned by Oreſtes, to gain credit for what he had aſſerted.

error blamed in the laſt ſpecies, for the poet might have added what circumſtances (6) he choſe. The ſame objection may be made to the diſcovery by the ſhuttle (7), in the Tereus of Sophocles.

The third ſpecies are by recollection, either when the ſight of ſome object cauſes the diſcovery, as in the Cyprii of Dicæogenes, where a perſon burſts into tears, on ſeeing a picture; or when it ariſes from

(6) Therefore he might have produced the diſcovery from the incidents.

(7) Κερκίδος φωνῆ. Scaliger conceived this to mean the imitation of the voice of a ſwallow, by means of a ſhuttle. Goulſton renders it, "Radii "textorii vox in tela depicta." It is impoſſible to determine whether the transformation of Progne into

from words (8), as Ulyſſes, on hearing the muſician in the palace of Alcinous, weeps from the remembrance of the ſtory, and is thence diſcovered.

The fourth is by a ſyllogiſm. As, in the Coephori, Electra reaſons thus:

into a ſwallow, or Philomela into a nightingale, is here hinted at as expreſſed by the motion of the ſhuttle. If we have in one epigrammatiſt,

Κερκίδας ὀρθρολάλοισι χελιδόσιν εἰκειλοφώνους,

another mentions

Κερκίδα εὐποιητὸν ἀηδόνα τὰν ἰν ἱρίθοις.

And Virgil's epithet, Æn. vii. v. 275, applies equally to both:

"Arguto tenues percurrens pectine telas."

Κιρκὰς, according to Heſychius, is itſelf the name of a bird.

(8) Ἡ ἐν Ἀλκινόου ὠπὸ λόγε —Heinsius.

(9) "A perſon reſembling me is arrived, "but no one reſembles me except Oreſ- "tes, therefore Oreſtes is arrived." And in the tragedy of Iphigenia, written by Polyides the ſophiſt, it is probable for Oreſtes to reaſon thus: "My ſiſter was "ſacrificed, and I am going to be ſacri- "ficed likewiſe." Or as in the Tydeus of Theodectus, where it is ſaid (10),

(9) In the Coephori of Æſchylus, Electra finds ſome hair laid on the tomb of Agamemnon, and, from its reſemblance of her own, concludes it muſt belong to Oreſtes.

(10) Polinices, ſon to Œdipus, not chuſing to tell his name to Adraſtus, ſays only he is grandſon to a king, who was killed as he was going to conſult the oracle about the fate of his ſon; from which Adraſtus concluded he was grandſon to Laius.

"A per-

"A perſon coming to ſee his ſon, is de-
"ſtroyed himſelf." Or as in the Phinidæ, where, ſeeing the place they are conducted to, and reaſoning on the reſponſe of the oracle, they conclude they are doomed to periſh there, as it is the place where they were expoſed.

There is alſo a ſpecies of diſcovery ariſing from a falſe reaſoning of the ſpectators. As (11) in the Ulyſſes Pſeudangelus,

(11) This is the only paſſage of the Poetic which ſeems totally inexplicable, and is therefore, I ſhould preſume, much corrupted. The following is the remark of Batteux: "Ulyſſes pretends to "be one of his companions; and in that character "aſſerts that Ulyſſes is dead, and that he had buried "him. And, as his perſon is unknown, to gain "credit, he ſays, that if they will ſhew him the "bow of Ulyſſes, mixed with other bows, he ſhall

angelus, where a perſon ſays he ſhall know the bow of Ulyſſes, which he has

"know it. They do ſo, he knows it, and for "ſome time the death of Ulyſſes is credited; though "this was too light a foundation for believing the "deceit, as an impoſtor might learn the particular "ſhape of Ulyſſes's bow from others. To this "falſe reaſoning, or paralogiſm, it appears a true "one muſt have followed. As in the Merope of "M. Voltaire, Merope, on ſeeing the helmet of "her ſon brought in, believed the perſon who "brought it had aſſaſſinated him; a falſe reaſoning "deceives her, and almoſt induces her to kill him "herſelf, till a further diſcovery, by true reaſon-"ing, ſaves him." But I fear this ingenious explanation will hardly be found concluſive. Ariſtotle ſays the diſcovery is made by falſe reaſoning; but here the deception is ſuppoſed to be made by falſe reaſoning, and the diſcovery by true. Ariſtotle ſays it is made by a falſe reaſoning of the theatre, (i. e. the ſpectators) ἐκ παραλογισμοῦ τοῦ θεατοῦ, and not of the perſons of the drama, as is ſuppoſed in this explanation.

never

never ſeen, and the ſpectator (12), reaſoning falſely, ſuppoſes he is diſcovered by thoſe means.

But of all theſe forms, that diſcovery is beſt which is derived from the incidents themſelves, the ſurprize ariſing from probable means; as in the Œdipus of Sophocles, and the tragedy of Iphigenia, where it is probable ſhe ſhould be deſirous of ſending a letter. Theſe depend on themſelves, without the aid of fictitious tokens and jewels. And next to theſe, are thoſe effected by a ſyllogiſm.

(12) Τὸ δὲ, i. e. θέατρον.

CHAP. XVII.

FURTHER OBSERVATIONS ON TRAGIC POETRY, AND ITS COMPOSITION.

THE poet, as well when he compoſes the incidents, as when he adds the language, ought, as much as poſſible, to conſider every thing as paſſing before his eyes. For then, ſeeing all the circumſtances in the cleareſt light, and as if he were himſelf preſent with the actors, he will eaſily find out what is proper, and what improper in the performance. The neceſſity

neceſſity of this is proved by the diſgrace that happened to Carcinus. The abſurdity of Amphiaraus going out of the temple unſeen by the ſpectators, did not ſtrike him; but the tragedy was condemned on the ſtage, the audience being offended with the impropriety.

The poet alſo ſhould enter as much as poſſible into the ſpirit of the ſubject he undertakes. For (1) thoſe who are moved by paſſions themſelves, will expreſs thoſe paſſions more naturally from their own feelings. He who is affected himſelf, will beſt affect others, and he that is really angry, will expreſs anger with the

(1) — — Si vis me flere, dolendum eſt
Primum ipſi tibi.— Hor.

moſt

moſt truth. A good poet, therefore, in this reſpect, may be ſaid to reſemble a madman; the imagination of one being eaſily ſuſceptible (2) of impreſſions, as the other is really tranſported.

Whether the poet uſes known ſtories, or invents new ones of his own, he ſhould firſt form his fable generally, and afterwards inſert (3) the epiſodes. What I

(2) Stephens, in his Theſaurus, ſays of εὔπλαστος, "Exponitur etiam, qui facile formam induit?" This paſſage is finely illuſtrated by Shakeſpear:

The poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,
Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven;
And as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
Turns them to ſhapes, and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name.

(3) Επισόδιον, or ἐπισόδια, παρεμβάσεις.--WINSTANLEY.

mean

mean by forming the fable generally, I will illuſtrate from the ſtory of Iphigenia. "A virgin on the point of being ſacri- "ficed, ſuddenly diſappears, unperceiv- "ed by the ſacrificers, and is tranſported "to another country, in which there is a "law to offer up all ſtrangers to a cer- "tain goddeſs, to whom ſhe is appointed "prieſteſs. Some time afterwards, her "brother accidentally arrives there:" (the reaſon of his coming being the com- mand of an oracle, which has nothing to do with the general plan, and the cauſe of which is foreign to the fable.) "He "comes, is ſeized, and is on the point of "being ſacrificed, when he is diſcovered "by his ſiſter;" (either in the manner feigned

feigned by Euripides (4), or as, with probability, by Polyides, from his ſaying it was not only doomed for his ſiſter to be ſacrificed, but himſelf alſo;) "and by "this circumſtance he is preſerved." After this, the names are fixed, and then the epiſodic parts are added. But it is neceſſary that the epiſodes (5) ſhould be connected with the fable, like the madneſs of Oreſtes, which occaſions his being taken, and his ſafety, by means of the luſtration.

(4) In the Iphigenia in Tauris of Euripides, Oreſtes diſcovers himſelf expreſsly to his ſiſter, and is obliged to uſe many arguments to convince her he is her brother. This is blamed by Ariſtotle in the preceding chapter, (ſee note 5,) and the arrangement of Polyides approved.

(5) Here epiſode has its uſual ſenſe.

In

In the drama, the epiſodes ſhould be conciſe, but the epopee derives its length from them. The ſimple argument of the Odyſſey is ſhort (6). "A man, abſent from home for many years, is detained by Neptune, and loſes his companions. In the mean time, his domeſtic affairs are waſted by ſuitors to his wife, and there is a conſpiracy againſt his ſon. At length, he is driven on his own coaſt by a tempeſt, and, after diſcovering himſelf to a few friends, attacks the ſuitors, is preſerved himſelf, and deſtroys his enemies." This is all the real argument, the reſt is epiſode.

(6) Μικρὸς, not μακρὸς.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVIII.

OF THE PLOT AND ITS SOLUTION.—OF THE OFFICE OF THE CHORUS.

A PLOT, and its ſolution, are incident to every tragedy. The plot conſiſts of all that is out of the action, and often of many things that are in it. The reſt is the ſolution. I call every thing the plot from the beginning to that extreme part from whence the change (1) of fortune

(1) There is a great diſpute among the commentators, whether it ſhould be εἰς εὐτυχίαν, or ἀτυχίαν.

tune ariſes; and what paſſes from the commencement of the change of fortune to the end of the piece, the ſolution. For example, in the tragedy of Lynceus written by Theodectus, the plot comprehends the preceding (2) events, and the taking of the young man; and the ſolution, what happens from the accuſation of murder to the end.

There are four ſpecies of tragedy, for

ἀτυχίαν. All the MSS. as well as printed copies, have the firſt, but the principles of Ariſtotle ſeem to require the laſt, or both: and the Latin tranſlation by Valla, printed in 1498, prior to any edition of the original Greek, has infortunium; therefore we may conclude his MS. read ἀτυχία. See Winſtanley's note.

(2) For πεπραγμένα, read προπεπραγμένα.—VITTORIO, WINSTANLEY.

ſuch

ſuch are the number of its parts that have been mentioned. The complex, which depends entirely on peripetia and diſcovery. The pathetic, like the tragedies of Ajax and Ixion. The moral, like the Phthiotides, and the Peleus. And fourthly, the ſimple(3), like the Phorcides, the Prometheus, and thoſe tragedies which repreſent what paſſes in the infernal regions. The poet ſhould endeavour to excel in all theſe forms, or at leaſt in as many as poſſible, and in thoſe that are moſt eſteemed; eſpecially at preſent,

(3) From the recapitulation of theſe forms at the beginning of chapter xxiv. Winſtanley propoſes to ſupply the word ἁπλοῦν. Batteux inſerts ὁμαλὲν from a MS. and tranſlates it "ſimple et unie."

when

when people are ſo ready to cenſure poets. For, having excellent writers in each particular ſpecies, they now expect every poet to excel in them all.

The difference or ſameneſs of one tragedy and another, muſt not be eſtimated by the fable, but by the plot and ſolution. There are many who form the plot well, and the ſolution ill, though they ought to be equally ſkilful in both.

It (4) is neceſſary to remember, as has often already been obſerved, not to give a tragedy the form of an epic poem. I mean one containing many fables; as if

(4) I entirely agree with Vittorio in the reſtoration of theſe words, Χρὴ δὲ, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, μιμεῖσθαι κ. τ. λ.

the Iliad were to be comprized in one tragedy. For though on account of the length of the poem, every part there has its proper proportion, in the drama this would too much exceed the expected boundary. As a proof of this, thoſe have either totally failed in the attempt, or been unfavourably received, who have endeavoured to repreſent the whole deſtruction of Troy, and not divided it into parts; (I (5) do not mean in the manner of

(5) Batteux is of opinion that both Euripides and Æſchylus are propoſed here as models, and that καὶ μὴ is only a repetition of the negative, introducing the ſecond example, and that Niobe is aſcribed to Æſchylus, and Medea to Euripides. But I think the conſtruction of the Greek will hardly juſtify this meaning. I imagine Ariſtotle, having

of Æſchylus, but like Euripides, in his Niobe and Medea.) To this fault alone may the ill ſucceſs of Agatho be attributed.

In the tragedies that depend on the peripetia, and thoſe that have a ſingle (6) action, the poets often attain their purpoſe by means which appear wonderful, and which are not only tragical (7), but agree-

ing propoſed chuſing a part only of a ſtory, added, leſt his readers ſhould be influenced by a bad example, that this ſhould be done in the manner of Euripides in thoſe tragedies, and not according to the general manner of Æſchylus.

(6) Not having a different ending for the good and bad. Ἁπλόος here, as in chapter xii. ſee note 3, is oppoſed to διπλόος.

(7) Does not this a little militate againſt the aſſertion of Ariſtotle, chapter xiii. that "A very

agreeable to our feelings. As, when a wiſe, but wicked man, like Siſyphus, is deceived; or, when a brave, but unjuſt man is vanquiſhed. Neither will this be contrary to probability, ſince, as Agatho obſerves, it is probable for many things to happen which ſeem improbable.

The (8) chorus ought to be conſidered as one of the actors. It ſhould be deem-

" wicked perſon ſhould not be repreſented as fall-
" ing from happineſs to miſery; for, though ſuch
" an arrangement might be agreeable to our feel-
" ings, it would excite neither pity nor fear."

(8) " Actoris partes chorus, officiumque virile
" Defendat, neu quid medios intercinat actus
" Quod non propoſito conducat, et hæreat apte."
HOR.

ed

ed a part of the whole, and ſhould contribute to the action. Yet (9) not in the manner uſed by Euripides, but like Sophocles. In other poets, the parts that are (10) ſung ſeem to have no more relation to the fable, than to another tragedy, and from this came the cuſtom of introducing the embolima (11), Agatho

(9) Here ὥσπερ and μὴ ὥσπερ are exactly oppoſed to each other, as in the paſſage taken notice of, note 5.

(10) Τὰ ἀδόμενα οὐ μᾶλλον κ. τ. λ.

(11) The embolima, both from this account of Ariſtotle, and the correſpondent paſſage in Horace, appear to have been pieces of muſic performed between the acts, that were foreign to the ſubject of the tragedy, probably to gratify the audience, by introducing ſome favorite compoſition or performer.

firſt beginning it. But where is the difference between ſinging the embolima, or fitting a ſpeech, or whole act of one tragedy, to another?

CHAP. XIX.

OF THE SENTIMENT AND LANGUAGE.

HAVING already ſpoken ſufficiently of the other parts, it now remains to treat of the language and ſentiment; though what relates to the ſentiment ſhould rather be defined in the treatiſes on rhetoric, as belonging more particularly to that ſcience. But ſince ſentiment comprehends whatever may be effected by means of ſpeech, the different offices of

which are to demonſtrate, to refute, to excite the paſſions, ſuch as fear, anger, and pity; and to amplify, or extenuate; it is manifeſt that in the drama (1) the ſame forms muſt be uſed, when it is neceſſary to repreſent things lamentable, terrible, great, or probable; only with this difference, that in the drama theſe ſentiments ſhould have their effect (2), even independent of any aſſiſtance from

(1) Inſtead of πράγμασι, Heinſius propoſes to read δράμασι. But why may not πράγμασι be conſidered here as equivalent to τῇ τῶν πραγμάτων συστάσει?

(2) From the circumſtances of the ſtory being ſimply told.

theatrical

theatrical (3) repreſentation. Whereas, in an oration, they muſt be chiefly produced by the orator, and reſult from the compoſition; for what would be the uſe of the orator, if they were to ariſe ſpontaneouſly (4) without the aid of his ſpeech?

There is one part of the theory of elocution relating to the mode of expreſſion, which principally belongs to the player, and thoſe who excel in that art. Such as to diſtinguiſh between ſupplication, command, narration, queſtion, anſwer,

(3) Ἄνευ διδασκαλίας. Διδάσκαλος, πᾶς ὁ ἐπιγὼν τι περὶ τὴν δραματοποιὸν καὶ τῶν κυκλίων χορῶν παρασκευήν. HESYCHIUS.

(4) For ἡδία I would read ἥδη.

and

and any other circumſtances of the ſame kind. For no blame, worthy of notice, can be imputed to the poetry, from knowledge or ignorance of theſe things. Since who can conceive that to be an error of the poet which Pythagoras cenſures, when he aſſerts he has commanded, inſtead of entreating, by ſaying,

"Achilles' wrath, O heavenly goddeſs, ſing;"

ILIAD i.

becauſe, to bid a perſon do, or not do, a thing, is a command. This, therefore, I ſhall omit, as belonging to another art, and not to poetry.

CHAP.

CHAP. XX.

OF THE PARTS OF LANGUAGE.

LANGUAGE in general is divided into theſe (1) parts: Element or letter, ſyllable, connective particle, name or

(1) "According to Ariſtotle, the parts of ſpeech "are four. The article, name, verb, and con- "nective. This is not ſo inaccurate as it may "ſeem at firſt ſight to be: for we may ſuppoſe "that to the name he refers both the noun, and "its repreſentative the pronoun; to the verb, (or "attribute) the adjective, participle, verb, (ſtrictly "ſo

or noun, word or verb, article, caſe, and ſentence.

A letter is an undivided ſound, yet not of any ſort, but of that only, from which an intelligible ſound may be formed: for though the ſounds made by beaſts are undivided, none of them can be called a letter. Letters are divided into vowels, ſemivowels, and mutes. A vowel has a ſound independent of articulation (2), as A, or

" ſo called,) and adverb, and conſequently the in-
" terjection; and to the connective, both the con-
" junction, and prepoſition."—BEATTIE's Theory of Language, near the end.

(2) Dacier reads προσβολῆς, and renders it " by " adding" (i. e. a vowel). The ſame tranſlation is found in the Spaniſh verſion of Ordonez, corrected by Florez, though the uſual reading is preſerved in

A, or O. A ſemivowel has a ſound with articulation, as S, or R. A mute has articulation, but no ſound of itſelf, without being joined to ſome letter that has a ſound, as G, or D. Letters further differ from each other, by the form of the mouth, the (3) organs of pronunciation by aſpiration or ſoftneſs, by length or brevity, and by acuteneſs, brevity, or the

in the text. But I cannot reconcile this definition of a mute with its diſtinction from a ſemivowel. Προσβολὴ means here the alliſion of the tongue againſt the various parts of the mouth, in the formation of letters.

(3) I think Goulſton right, who ſuppoſes Ariſtotle to mean by τόποις the different organs of ſpeech, from which letters receive the ſeveral denominations of naſal, dental, labial, &c. Heinſius reads τύποις.

medium

medium (4) between both: all which circumſtances are principally to be attended to in metrical compoſitions.

A ſyllable is compoſed of a mute and a letter that has a ſound. G and R, without the addition of A, do (5) not form a ſyllable,

(4) That is circumflexed.

(5) The ſenſe calling for a negative, which Robertellus ſays is authorized by a MS. I have admitted it, though the excluſion of it ſeems moſt agreeable with the context, as Ariſtotle defines a ſyllable to be compoſed ἐξ ἀφώνου, καὶ φωνὴν ἔχοντος, "of a mute and a letter having a ſound." Now, he deſcribes a ſemivowel as having ſound with articulation, as a vowel has without, τὸ μετὰ προσβολῆς ἔχον φωνὴν ἀκουστὴν. Had Ariſtotle meant to define a ſyllable according to the notion followed in the alteration, (and which I have been obliged to adopt as the leaſt of two difficulties, as I cannot conceive how

ſyllable, but (6) with the addition of A they do, as *Gra*. But the inveſtigation of theſe diſtinctions belongs to the art of verſification.

A (7) connective particle is a ſound without meaning, which does not, when placed among many ſounds, affect the ſignification of any ſingle one of them; and whoſe nature it is to be placed either at the extremities, or in the middle of a

how *gr* can be called a ſyllable,) he ſhould have deſcribed it to be, ἐξ ἀφώνου, ἢ ἡμιφώνου, καὶ φωνήεντος, compounded of a mute or ſemivowel, and a vowel.

(6) Ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ Α.---MS. quoted by Robertellus.

(7) I have endeavoured to give the cleareſt ſenſe I could of this difficult paſſage, following the reading propoſed by Winſtanley in this and the ſucceeding paragraph.

ſentence,

ſentence, unleſs it requires to be placed by itſelf at the beginning (8), as *therefore, certainly, indeed.* Or, in other words, it is a ſound without meaning itſelf, whoſe property it is to form one ſenſe (9) from many intelligible ſounds.

An article is an unmeaning ſound, which marks the beginning, the end, or the diſtinctions of a ſentence; as (10) Τὸ

(8) I do not ſee how this definition agrees with the Greek examples, μὲν, ἤτοι, δὴ, except, as Cooke ſuppoſes, we are to underſtand it as meant of the beginning of the ſenſe, and not the words of the ſentence.

(9) Σημαντικὴν φωνὴν.

(10) I have retained the Greek examples, as in Engliſh the article cannot be connected with a verb or prepoſition. Beſides, our article would not

Τὸ φημὶ, or Τὸ περὶ, or Τὰ ἄλλα. Or, in other words, it is a ſound without meaning itſelf, which does not affect the ſignification of any one ſound among many, and whoſe nature it is to be placed either at the extremities, or in the middle of a ſentence.

A noun is a compounded ſound, having ſignification, but not marking time, and whoſe parts, taken by themſelves, have no meaning. For even in names compoſed of two words, we never con-

not agree with the definition in the preceding ſentence; for, as Goulſton obſerves, the article Τὸ in theſe inſtances ſhews the words to be diſtinct from the reſt.

ceive either of the parts, taken ſeparately, to have any meaning; as, in the name Theodorus, *doron* has no meaning.

A verb is a compounded, ſignificant ſound, marking time; the parts of which, as in the noun, have no ſignification in themſelves. *Man*, and *white*, do not ſpecify time; but *he walks*, and *he walked*, do, one a preſent, the other a paſt time.

A caſe is incident both to the noun and the verb, and either marks ſuch relations as *of*, or *from*, or *to*, a thing; or ſhews the number, whether it be one, or many, as *man*, or *men*; or marks whether the intention of the ſpeaker is to queſtion or order. *Does he walk?* or *walk thou*, are, in their ſpecies, the caſes of verbs.

A ſen-

A ſentence is a compounded, ſignificant ſound, ſome parts of which have meaning by themſelves. It (11) is allowed there may be a ſentence without a verb, for every ſentence is not compoſed both of verbs and nouns; as, for inſtance, the definition (12) of a man. Yet, a part of it has always ſome ſignification, as the name Cleon, in the ſentence *Cleon walked*. The unity of a ſentence ariſes from two cauſes; either from having one ſignification, or from being joined by a

(11) I have hazarded a tranſpoſition of the text, as giving a clearer ſenſe. Ἀλλ' ἐνδέχεται ἀνεύ ῥημάτων εἶναι λόγον, οὐ γὰρ ἅπας λόγος ἐκ ῥημάτων καὶ ὀνομάτων σύγκειται, οἷον ὁ ἀνθρώπου ὁρισμός.

(12) A rational animal.

number of connective particles. Thus the Iliad is one, by means of connective particles, and the definition of a man, by having one signification.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXI.

OF NOUNS OR NAMES.

NOUNS are either ſimple, (by ſimple, I mean not compoſed of ſignificant ſounds,) or compounded. And of theſe laſt, ſome are compoſed partly of ſignificant, and partly of unmeaning ſounds, and ſome entirely of ſignificant ſounds. Others, again, are trebly and quadruply compounded, like many of the words uſed by the dithyrambic (1) poets, as, for inſtance, Hermocaïcoxanthus.

Nouns

(1) Μεγαλιωτῶν. This word has perplexed all the commentators. Harles ſays, "It ſtrikes me

Nouns are either proper or foreign (2), or metaphorical, or ornamental, or invented for the purpoſe, or lengthened, or ſhortened, or changed.

I call

" that it ſhould be μέγα λαλῶντων, i. e. of thoſe who " compoſe dithyrambics. Or perhaps Ariſtotle " alludes to ſome kind of Arcadian verſe, at that " time ſung by the Megapolitans, in which Her- " mocaïcoxanthus occurred, compoſed of theſe " three words, Ἑρμος, Καϊκος, and Ξανθος, and there- " fore he wrote Μεγαλοπολιτων." I have adopted the firſt idea.

(2) The Γλῶτλα, which, for want of a better word, I tranſlate foreign, muſt not be conſidered in the ſame light with our introduction of pure French and Italian words into our compoſitions, than which nothing can be more affected and inelegant. It conſiſted in transferring a word from one of the Greek dialects to another. Nothing reſembles this ſo much as the inſertion of ſuch Scottiſh expreſſions as *Bourn*, and *Eyne*, in our ſongs: though this is

not

I call that a proper name, which is in general uſe; and that a foreign one, which is uſed by ſtrangers. The ſame word may, therefore, be both proper and foreign; as the word Σίγυνον (3) is proper to the Cyprians, and foreign to us.

A metaphor (4) is the tranſpoſition of

not exactly ſimilar, the Scottiſh being now only a provincial dialect, and therefore not proper for the epopee or tragedy. See BEATTIE's Eſſay on ludicrous Compoſition, chapter ii. near the end. I imagine Ariſtotle would have ſtrongly reprobated the admiſſion of Perſian or Syrian words, had any of his countrymen been ſo deficient in taſte as to have attempted it.

(3) A dart made entirely of ſteel.

(4) In the words of Mr. Harris: "A metaphor "is the transferring of a word from its uſual mean- "ing to an analogous one, and then employing "it according to that transfer." PHILOLOGICAL ENQUIRIES, part ii. chapter x.

a word to an unuſual ſignification, either from the genus to the ſpecies, or from the ſpecies to the genus, or according to analogy. I call from genus to ſpecies ſuch an inſtance as this:

" Far from your capital, my ſhip reſides
" At Reithrus."—— Odyſſey, l. i.

For to be moored is a ſpecies of reſidence.

From ſpecies to genus, ſuch as

——————" Ulyſſes
" Ten thouſand glorious actions has perform'd."

Ten thouſand being a great number, which is now uſed to expreſs many. From ſpecies to ſpecies, ſuch inſtances as

(5) " The brazen falchion drew away his life."

(5) So in Virgil,

—" Ferit eminus haſta,
" Vocem animamque rapit trajecto gutture."—

And

And

(6) "Cut by the ruthleſs ſword."

Where, to draw away, and to cut, are uſed alternately for each other, for both ſignify to remove ſomething. And I call it by analogy, when the ſecond term having the ſame relation to the firſt that the fourth has to the third, the fourth is uſed inſtead of the ſecond, and the ſecond inſtead of the fourth; and ſometimes what has only analogy(7) to a thing, is uſed for

(6) Winſtanley propoſes, inſtead of τάμων ἀτηρεῖϊ χαλκῷ, to read τάμε νηλεῖ χαλκῷ, which is the end of a line in Homer. Il. iii. v. 292.

(7) I am not ſatisfied with my own, or any other interpretation of this paſſage, of which Heinſius ſays, "Certum eſt, non eſſe locum qui magis fa-

"tigavit

for what it really is. As a cup has the ſame relation to Bacchus, that a ſhield has to Mars, a ſhield may be called the cup of Mars, and a cup the ſhield of Bacchus. Evening has the ſame relation to day, that old-age has to life; therefore evening may be called the old-age of day, and old-age the evening of life, or, as it is ſtyled by Empedocles, "the ſet-"ting of life." In ſome inſtances, even where there is no analogous name, the ſame method may be employed: to ſcat-

"tigavit interpretes." Batteux tranſlates it, "Quel-"ques fois même, on met ſimplement le mot ana-"logique, au lieu du mot propre." Winſtanley, with his uſual happineſs of conjecture, propoſes to read, καὶ ἐνίοτε προστιθέασι ἀνθ' ἧς λέγει πρὸς ὃ ἐστιν ΑΝΑΛΟΓΟΝ, οἷον κ. τ. λ.

ter

ter grain, is called to ſow; but there is no name for the ſun's ſcattering his beams, and yet that has the ſame analogy to the ſun, that ſowing has to grain. We may ſay, therefore,

(8) "Sowing the flame divine."

This ſort of metaphor may be uſed in a different manner, by adding ſome circumſtances that belong to another thing, and denying part of what belongs to itſelf. As if a ſhield ſhould be called "the (9) cup of Mars indeed, but with-"out wine."

Nouns

(8) —— Et lumine conſerit arva. LUCRETIUS.

(9) I follow the emendation propoſed by Winſtanley, εἰ τὴν ἀσπίδα εἴποι φιάλην ΜΕΝ Ἄρεως, ἀλλ' ΑΟΙΝΟΝ.

And

Nouns may be ſaid to be invented for the purpoſe, when the poet gives any thing an appellation it never had before. The ſubſtituting Ἔρνυται (10) inſtead of Κέρατα, for *horns*, and calling a *prieſt* Ἀρητῆρ, inſtead of Ἱερεὺς, may come under this deſcription.

And this agrees with what Ariſtotle has juſt obſerved. The ſaying "the cup of Mars," is adding a circumſtance that belongs to another thing, τὸ ἀλλότριον προσαγορεύσας, and joining to it "but without "wine," is denying ſomething that belongs to itſelf, τῶν οἰκείων τι ἀποφῆσα. This daring metaphor, "audaciſſimum metaphoræ exemplum," Harles ſays, is ſuppoſed to be taken from Theognis the dithyrambic poet.

(10) Ἔρνυται is derived from ἔρνη, which, according to Heſychius, ſignifies *buds*, or *ſcions*. Ἀρητῆς is from ἀράομαι, *to pray*.

As

As to nouns that are lengthened, or ſhortened, the one is done by uſing a long vowel inſtead of a ſhort one, or by inſerting an additional ſyllable; the other, by taking any thing away either from the word itſelf, or the additional ſyllable. Πόληος for Πόλεος, and Πηληϊάδεω for Πηλείδȣ, are lengthened names, and ſuch as κρῖ (11) and δῶ, or as ὄψ in this example,

Μία γίνεται ἀμφοτέρων ὄψ,

are ſhortened ones.

A noun is changed when part of its original form is left, and ſomething added beſides, as Δεξιτερὸν inſtead of Δεξιὸν.

(11) For κρίθη, δῶμα, and ὄψις.

Nouns

Nouns alſo are either maſculine, feminine, or neuter. The maſculine end either in N or P, or in one of thoſe letters that are compounded of mutes(12), which
Ξ are two, viz. Ψ or Ξ. The feminine end in the long vowels H or Ω, or in long A. So the number of terminations for maſculine and feminine are equal, the ter-
Ξ minations of Ψ and Ξ being the ſame(13). No noun ends in a mute or ſhort vowel, and only three in I, viz. μέλι, κόμμι, and πέπερι; and five in Υ, viz. πῶϋ, νάπυ, γόνυ, δόρυ, and ἄστυ. The neuter end

(12) Of the mutes π and κ, and the ſemivowel σ.

(13) Both ending in σ.

either

either in these vowels, or in N and Σ (14).

(14) Heinsius justly observes that this passage must be greatly corrupted. The best emendation of it is in Winstanley's notes, of which this is the substance. "The masculine end in ν, ρ, or σ, and "its compounds, which are two, ψ, and ξ. The "feminine end in the vowels that are always long, "and long α; therefore the masculine and feminine "happen to be equal in number, as ψ, ξ, and σ, "are the same. No noun ends with a mute or "short vowel, three only in ι, and five in υ. The "neuter end in these vowels, and in ν, σ, or ρ."

CHAP.

CHAP. XXII.

OF THE EXCELLENCE OF LANGUAGE.

THE perfection of language conſiſts in being perſpicuous without meanneſs. Language is moſt perſpicuous when it conſiſts entirely of proper names, but then it will be mean; examples of which may be drawn from the poetry of Cleophon and Sthenelus. It will have more dignity, and be further removed from the vulgar idiom, by the uſe

uſe of uncommon expreſſions; I mean the foreign, the metaphorical, the lengthened, and all except thoſe in common uſe. But were a poem to be entirely compoſed of theſe, it would be either an enigma, or a continued barbariſm. If chiefly compoſed of metaphors, it would be an enigma, and if of foreign words, a barbariſm. For the property of an enigma is to make thoſe circumſtances that really belong to a thing, have the appearance of impoſſibility, which cannot reſult from the arrangement of the words (1) alone, but muſt be effected by meta-

(1) Heinſius propoſes to read τὴν τῶν κυρίων ὀνομάτων σύνθεσιν, making the oppoſition between common names and metaphors.

phors. As (2), "I saw one man glewing "braſs to another man with fire," and others of the ſame kind. But a barbariſm is occaſioned by the uſe of foreign words. Therefore theſe modes of expreſſion ſhould be tempered with common ones; for then, while the foreign words, the metaphors, the ornamented phraſes, and the other ſpecies that have been mentioned, hinder the language from being vulgar

(2) The whole enigma is preſerved by Athenæus:

Ανρ' εἶδον πυρὶ χαλκὸν ἐπ' ἄνερι κολλίσαντα,
Ὄυτῳ συνκόλλως ὥστε σύναιμα ποῖειν.

"I ſaw a man glewing braſs to another man by "means of fire, and ſo glewing, that the ſame "blood flowed through both." This alludes to the operation of cupping, which the ancients performed with brazen cups.

and

and mean, the proper names give it perſpicuity.

The lengthening, ſhortening, and changing of names, contribute not a little to make the language elevated, and yet perſpicuous. The expreſſions, being different from thoſe in common uſe, diſtinguiſh it from the vulgar idiom; and yet its near reſemblance to what is generally ſpoken, renders it perſpicuous. Thoſe, therefore, do not find fault with juſtice, who blame this mode of ſpeech, and, like the ancient Euclides, ridicule the poet for the eaſe there muſt be in compoſing verſe, if it were permitted to lengthen the quantity of ſyllables at pleaſure, making iam-

bic (3) verſes in common diſcourſe. The examples he produces are,

Ητὶ Χάριν εἶδον Μαραθῶνα βαδίζοντα.

and

(3) This paſſage has been very perplexing to the critics. The Greek examples not being reducible to any ſpecies of verſe, ſome correct them to make them iambics. Others, becauſe no ſyllable appears altered or lengthened, ſupply the alteration themſelves, as is done by Heinſius; he alſo alters the context very much, adding, after the word ἐκτείνειν, the words ἢ ἐξαλλάττειν, and reading, inſtead of ἰαμβοποιήσας, ἄμφω ποιήσας, making this the ſenſe of Ariſtotle: "Though Euclides ſaid it would be "eaſy to make verſes, if any word might be length-"ened or changed at pleaſure, yet he himſelf has "done both, even in proſe, as in theſe examples." But I confeſs I ſee no reaſon for altering one word of the original, as it now ſtands, from which I think a clear ſenſe may be deduced, without pretending to deſerve the compliment promiſed by Heinſius,

and

Οὐκ ἂν γενάμενος τὸν ἐκείνῳ ἐξ ἰλλέβορον.

Indeed, it is apparent how ridiculous ſuch an abuſe of this licenſe muſt be, ſince

Heinſius, of being "vates optimus." Euclides objects, that if a poet may lengthen what ſyllables he chuſes, the compoſition of verſe would be ſo eaſy, that iambics might be made even in common converſation; which is juſt equivalent with an Engliſhman's ſaying, that if a poet might accent what ſyllables he pleaſed, he might make blank verſe in common converſation. And if, to illuſtrate this, he were to quote the following line of Milton,

"To the garden of bliſs, thy ſeat prepared,"

ſurely the propriety of the quotation could not be queſtioned, becauſe it was not verſe, without a vicious pronunciation; ſince the illuſtration ariſes from accenting ſyllables that ſhould not be accented, as in the Greek, from pronouncing ſyllables long, which are really ſhort.

moderation (4) is equally required in the uſe of all the other parts. An abſurd and ridiculous affectation of metaphors, foreign words, and other forms of that ſort, would have the ſame effect; and yet we may ſee how advantageous a

(4) Τὸ δὲ μέτρον. I have ſome doubts if this ſhould not be rendered, "Since metre is eſſential "to all the parts (i. e. of verſification)." And that Ariſtotle, meaning to cenſure the hypercriticiſm of Euclides, having mentioned his objection to the arbitrary lengthening of ſyllables, his opinion of the ſubſequent eaſe of verſification, and his abſurd examples, adds, "But to uſe the licenſe in this way, "would be ridiculous, quantity (meaſure, μέτρον) "being a common eſſential to all kinds of verſe." And thus blames Euclides for cenſuring the uſe of a licenſe, from the poſſibility of a ridiculous abuſe of it. Τὸ μέτρον is employed in this ſenſe in the next ſentence.

proper

proper uſe of them is in poetry, by putting the words in verſe, and then ſubſtituting ordinary expreſſions for the foreign names, metaphors, and the other forms, which will demonſtrate the truth of our aſſertion. Euripides and Æſchylus both wrote the ſame iambic line, with the difference only of one word, which is common in one, and uncommon in the other, from which circumſtance, one line appears beautiful, and the other mean. Æſchylus, in his Philoctetes, writes,

"Lo! on my foot a waſting ulcer feeds!"

The other ſubſtitutes for *feeds*, *feaſts*.

What would be the effect, if, in this verſe of Homer,

"Not this weak pigmy wretch of mean deſign,"
Od. ix.

we ſhould inſert the common words *little* and *vile*; or, in this verſe, for

"A tripod table, and ignobler ſeat," Od. xx.

we ſhould ſay

"A three-foot table, and a lower ſeat:"

or, inſtead of

"The diſtant rocks re-bellow to the roar,"
Il. xvii.

we ſhould ſay

"reſounded with the noiſe."

Ari-

Ariphrades alſo ridicules the tragic poets, for employing forms of language that are not uſed in common converſation, and inverting (5) the order of the words, though their differing from common uſe is the very circumſtance that elevates the ſtyle. But of this he was ignorant.

There is great merit in uſing all the forms we have mentioned with propriety; ſuch as compounded and foreign words. But the greateſt art is to be happy at

(5) I have left out the examples, as they are peculiar to the Greek language. Their import will be clearly ſuggeſted to the Engliſh reader, by ſuch modes of expreſſion as "wrath divine" for "divine wrath," and "his power confeſs'd" for "confeſs'd his power."

form-

forming metaphors; for that alone cannot be acquired from others, but is itſelf a proof of a good-natured genius; ſince to form metaphors well, is to obſerve the ſimilitude of things.

Compounded words ſuit beſt with dithyrambic, foreign words with heroic, and metaphors with iambic verſe. Indeed, all that have been mentioned may be uſed in heroic verſe; but for iambics, which are chiefly an imitation of common diſcourſe, ſuch words are moſt calculated which may be uſed in converſation, viz. the proper, the metaphorical, and the ornamental.

This is ſufficient concerning tragedy, and dramatic imitation.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIII.

OF EPIC POETRY.

AS to imitations that are ſolely produced by narration and verſe, it is evident that even there, as in tragedy, the fables ſhould have a dramatic form, and relate to one entire and complete action, which has a beginning, a middle, and an end; and that, like one perfect animal, it ſhould produce its peculiar delight, and not follow the cuſtom of hiſtory,

tory, in which it is not neceſſary to confine the ſubject to one action, but to one period of time; and where every thing may be introduced that happened in that time, whether relating to one or more perſons, or whatever caſual connexion the events may have with each other. For as the ſea-fight at Salamis, and the battle with the Carthagenians in Sicily, though they happened at the ſame (1) time, by no means conduced to the ſame end; ſo, in after-times alſo, one event occaſionally

(1) Herodotus ſays the victory obtained by Gelo over the Carthagenians happened the ſame day with the battle of Salamis; but Diodorus Siculus ſays, on the ſame day with the battle of Thermopylæ.

hap-

happens at the ſame (2) period with another, without any ſingle conſequence proceeding from them. This manner is nevertheleſs purſued by the generality of poets.

(2) Θάτιερον μετὰ θάτιερα. "Interpreters have followed one another in rendering this paſſage *ſit unus poſt alterum.* This conſtruction muſt be erroneous, ſince μετὰ with a genitive, ſignifies 'in conjunction with.' The paſſage ſhould be rendered thus: 'For as the ſea-fight at Salamis, and the engagement with the Carthagenians at Sicily, happened κατὰ τὺς αὐτὺς χρόνυς, at the ſame time, though not at all tending to the ſame end; ſo καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐφιξῆς χρόνοις, in after-times alſo, ἐνίοτε γίνεται θάτιερον μετὰ θάτιερα, occaſionally one thing happens at the ſame period with another.'" For this excellent interpretation, ſo agreeable with the context, which the uſual one is totally unconnected with, we are obliged to the Monthly Review on COOKE's edition of the Poetic, July, 1787.

And

And in this reſpect, Homer, as we (3) have before obſerved, when compared with all other poets, may juſtly be called divine. He did not even attempt to deſcribe the whole Trojan war, though it had a beginning and an end. For it either would have been ſo large as not to be eaſily comprehended in one view; or, if it had been reduced to a moderate ſize, it would have been confuſed from the number of incidents. Taking, therefore, only one part for his ſubject, he introduces abundance of epiſodes from the other parts. Such as the catalogue of the ſhips, and the other epiſodes, with which he has adorned his poem. While

(3) See chapter iv.

other

other poets, like the authors of the Cypriacs (4), and the leſſer Iliad, are ſatisfied if they confine themſelves to one perſon, one period of time, or one action, though it may have many parts. Not more than one, or two tragedies at the moſt, could be formed either from the Iliad or the Odyſſey. But many might from the Cypriacs; and from the leſſer Iliad more than eight. As the Judgment

(4) That this poem had been attributed to Homer, ſo early as the time of Herodotus, is evident from that hiſtorian's contradicting the opinion. Κατὰ ταῦτα δὲ τὰ ἔπεα, καὶ τόδε τὸ χωρίον, οὐκ ἥκιστα ἀλλὰ μάλιστα δηλοῖ ὅτι οὐκ Ὁμήρου τὰ Κύπρια ἔπεα ἐστὶ ἀλλ' ἄλλου τινός. "From theſe words, and the mention of the "country, it is very clear that the Cyprian verſes "are not the work of Homer, but of ſome other "perſon."

of

of the arms, Philoctetes, Neoptolemus, Eurypylus, the Ptochia (5), the Lacænæ, the Deſtruction of Troy, the Return of the Greeks, Sinon, and the Troades.

(5) Πτωχία, poverty. Perhaps Ulyſſes going as a ſpy to Troy, diſguiſed in a mean habit.

CHAP. XXIV.

OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE EPOPEE AND TRAGEDY.

THE (1) ſpecies of the epopee are the ſame with thoſe of tragedy. For the epopee muſt be either ſimple, complex, moral, or pathetic. The parts alſo are the ſame, except the muſic and the ſcenery. It ſhould have peripetia, diſcovery, and pathos, and the language and ſentiment ſhould be beautiful. All of

(1) See chapter xviii.

theſe Homer uſed both with excellence(2) and propriety. For he formed his poems in ſuch a manner, that the Iliad is ſimple and pathetic; the Odyſſey, complex,(having diſcoveries throughout the whole,) and moral. And beſide this, he was ſuperior to all both in language and ſentiment.

But the epopee differs from tragedy in the length of the compoſition and the verſe. Its proper length has been mentioned already; there ſhould be a poſſibility of comprehending the beginning and end in one view; and that will happen if it is a little ſhort-

(2) I conceive πρῶτος here to mean firſt in point of excellence, not time.

er

er (3) than the compoſitions of the ancients, and is reduced to the ſame length with the number of tragedies that are performed at one time.

The epopee poſſeſſes many properties which contribute greatly to extend its length. For a number even of events

(3) Dacier ſuppoſes this to reflect on the length of the Cypriacs and the leſſer Iliad. Batteux imagines the Iliad and Odyſſey are included in the cenſure, and that Ariſtotle would reduce the epopee to eight or nine thouſand verſes. But this, I think, hardly agrees with the great praiſes he has juſt beſtowed on Homer. It muſt be obſerved that the Athenians were ſo fond of dramatic entertainments, as to have ſeveral tragedies performed at one ſitting: as many, it ſhould ſeem, from this obſervation, as would fill up the time taken in reading or reciting an epic poem.

that happen at one time, cannot be received in tragic imitation, but thoſe only which can be brought on the ſtage, and repreſented by actors. But the epopee, being a narration, may introduce many parts, from which, if they relate to the principal ſubject, the bulk of the poem will be encreaſed, which will add greatly to its magnificence; the hearer will be tranſported from place to place, and a variety of epiſodes may be introduced: whereas the ſameneſs of events, ſoon producing ſatiety, has occaſioned the failure of many tragedies.

The choice of heroic verſe has been confirmed by experience. For if a narrative imitation were to be attempted in any

any other ſort of verſe, or in many ſorts mixed, it would appear improper, ſince the heroic meaſure excels every other kind in dignity and elevation; on which account it is moſt capable of receiving foreign and metaphorical expreſſions. Since, therefore, narrative imitation is, of all others, moſt complete (4) in itſelf, and iambics and tetrameters require the aſſiſtance of movement, the one by means of dancers, the other by actors, it would be very abſurd to mix them together, as was done by Chæremon (5). On which ac-

(4) Περατὴς, full, complete. Becauſe it effects its end purely by itſelf. This muſt be the ſenſe in which Ariſtotle uſes the word, as he afterwards, on the whole, gives the preference to tragedy.

(5) See chapter i. note 4, towards the end.

that happen at one time, cannot be received in tragic imitation, but thoſe only which can be brought on the ſtage, and repreſented by actors. But the epopee, being a narration, may introduce many parts, from which, if they relate to the principal ſubject, the bulk of the poem will be encreaſed, which will add greatly to its magnificence; the hearer will be tranſported from place to place, and a variety of epiſodes may be introduced: whereas the ſameneſs of events, ſoon producing ſatiety, has occaſioned the failure of many tragedies.

The choice of heroic verſe has been confirmed by experience. For if a narrative imitation were to be attempted in any

any other ſort of verſe, or in many ſorts mixed, it would appear improper, ſince the heroic meaſure excels every other kind in dignity and elevation; on which account it is moſt capable of receiving foreign and metaphorical expreſſions. Since, therefore, narrative imitation is, of all others, moſt complete (4) in itſelf, and iambics and tetrameters require the aſſiſtance of movement, the one by means of dancers, the other by actors, it would be very abſurd to mix them together, as was done by Chæremon (5). On which ac-

(4) Περιττὴ, full, complete. Becauſe it effects its end purely by itſelf. This muſt be the ſenſe in which Ariſtotle uſes the word, as he afterwards, on the whole, gives the preference to tragedy.

(5) See chapter i. note 4, towards the end.

count, no long compoſition has been attempted in any other verſe, except the heroic, nature herſelf pointing out that as the moſt proper.

As Homer is admirable in many other things, ſo he is particularly excellent in being the only poet who was not ignorant how far he ought to act himſelf. The poet ſhould appear himſelf as little as poſſible, for whenever he ſpeaks in his own perſon, he ceaſes to be an imitator. Other poets ſhew themſelves through the whole poem, and only imitate a few things, and that ſeldom; but Homer, after a ſhort introduction, immediately introduces a man or a woman, or ſome other agent that is diſtinguiſhed

by

by manners; for he produces no agent without characteriſtic manners.

Though wonder ought to be excited by tragedy, yet things (6) contrary to reaſon, from which the marvellous chiefly ariſes, are better admitted in the epopee, from the action not being placed before the eyes. In the purſuit of Hector, the circumſtance of the Greeks ſtanding ſtill and not following, and Achilles making ſigns for them to ſtop, would appear ridiculous on the ſtage; but in the epopee the abſurdity is concealed. In general, whatever is wonderful is pleaſing; as a proof of which, whoever relates any fact

(6) Ἄλογον δ' ὁ.—VITTORIO.

is apt to add ſomething marvellous to gratify the hearers.

Homer alſo was the beſt inſtructor how to introduce ſpecious fallacies by means of falſe reaſoning (7). For men are apt to imagine, if ſome circumſtances generally follow certain cauſes, that, when thoſe circumſtances appear, the former events which uſually preceded them muſt alſo

(7) No part of the Poetic has perplexed the commentators more than this; and as it is uſually printed and pointed, it is impoſſible to make any ſenſe of it. I have, therefore, inſerted the original pointed differently, but with no alterations but what are juſtified by MSS. Οἴονται γὰρ ἄνθρωποι ὅταν τοῦδ' ὄντος ἢ γινομένου τοῦδε γίνεται, εἰ τὸ ὑστερόν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ πρότερον εἶναι ἢ γίνεσθαι, τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἔστι· ψευδὸς δ' ὁ ΕΙΗ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ψεύδους. ΑΛΛ' ΟΥΔΕ τούτου ὄντος, ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἢ γίνεσθαι ἢ προσθῆναι.

have

have happened; ſo, if the latter circumſtance be falſe, they conclude improperly that the former is ſo too: but it does not follow, that becauſe the latter circumſtance is real, that the former muſt neceſſarily have preceded it; yet, knowing the conſequence (8) certainly to exiſt, the mind, reaſoning falſely, ſuppoſes the cauſe to exiſt likewiſe.

He

(8) Whether true or falſe. Ἀληθὴς here is not oppoſed to ψευδὸς in the preceding ſentence, but means the certain conviction of the events being as they are ſuppoſed, whether true or falſe. Caſtelvetro gives examples of both. The firſt: "Dreams "are often divine viſions; Agamemnon has had "a dream; therefore he has had a divine viſion." Of the ſecond: "The brothers of Monna Sigiſ-"munda, finding that Ariguccio had not beaten "her, as he ſaid he had, deceiving themſelves,

"believe

He (9) alſo teaches us to prefer impoſſible circumſtances, if they are probable, to poſſible ones that are improbable, and not to form the fable of parts

" believe alſo that he had not found her preparing " to commit a fault." Cooke ingeniouſly ſuppoſes the whole paſſage not to allude to any particular circumſtance, but in general to the Iliad being founded on a real ſtory: for, knowing the ſiege of Troy to be an hiſtorical fact, and that ſuch perſons as Agamemnon, Achilles, &c. were preſent at it, we are induced to give ſome credit to all the fabulous circumſtances and characters that are added by the poet. And this agrees with the reaſon given by Ariſtotle, chapter ix. for retaining the names of real characters in tragedy. It ſeems alſo countenanced by theſe lines of Horace:

" Atque ita mentitur, ſic veris falſa remiſcet,
" Primo ne medium, medio ne diſcrepet imum."

(9) Προαιρεῖσθαι and μὴ ξυνίσασθαι I conceive to be governed by Ὅμηρος ἐδίδαξε.

that

that are contrary to reaſon: care ſhould be taken as much as poſſible to admit nothing abſurd; but if it cannot be avoided, it ſhould at leaſt be confined to circumſtances out of the action itſelf, as in the caſe of Œdipus being ignorant of the manner of Laius's death, or the man in the tragedy of the Myſians, who comes from Tegea to Myſia without ſpeaking. And it is ridiculous to ſay that otherwiſe the fables would be deſtroyed, for ſuch fables ſhould not at firſt be formed; but if they are ſo formed, it ſeems moſt reaſonable to hide the abſurdity as much as poſſible. The improbabilities in the Odyſſey, (ſuch, for inſtance, as the account of Ulyſſes being caſt on ſhore,)

would

would have been intolerable, if they had been written by an indifferent poet; but there the poet entirely conceals what is abſurd by other pleaſing circumſtances. (10)

The language ought particularly to be laboured in thoſe unintereſting (11) parts which are neither moral nor ſentimental; for the manners and ſentiment are obſcured by too ſplendid a diction.

(10) I have endeavoured to give the beſt interpretation I could of this paſſage, reading ἐκδέχεσθαι for ἐνδέχεσθαι, as propoſed by Winſtanley, and ἀφανίζει for ἐμφανίζει, with Vittorio.

(11) The connective parts of the poem, where the poet ſpeaks in his own perſon.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXV.

OF OBJECTIONS, AND HOW THEY MAY BE ANSWERED.

I WILL now endeavour to ſhew on how many, and what, things the objections of criticiſm may fall, and how they may be anſwered.

The poet being an imitator equally with a portrait painter, or any other artiſt who forms likeneſſes, it is evident he muſt chuſe one out of theſe three modes of imitation: he muſt either draw things as they were or are, or as they are ſaid or ima-

imagined to be, or as they ought to be. And he muſt form theſe imitations either by plain language, or by foreign words and metaphors.

Now, there are many licenſes incident to language which we concede to the poets. Neither is the propriety of poetry the ſame with that of politics or any other art. There are two ſorts of error to which poetry is liable, one proceeding from itſelf, the other from accident. If an imitation is attempted which it is not in the power of poetry to execute, the fault is in itſelf; but if the object is properly (1) choſen,

(1) Since no objection can be made to the choice of a poet or painter, who endeavours to repreſent a horſe, though he may from accident be unacquainted with

choſen, the fault ariſes from accident; as if a horſe ſhould be drawn or deſcribed lifting up both his right legs together. Or if the error happens from ignorance in any art; as, for inſtance, if a poet ſhould deſcribe what is impoſſible in medicine, or any other art. Whatever theſe may be, they will not be errors of the poetry itſelf. It is from the conſideration of theſe circumſtances that the objections of criticiſm ſhould be anſwered.

Firſt, then, the poet errs, if what he writes is impoſſible according to the rules

with ſome circumſtance belonging to it, ſuch as that here mentioned, I have no doubt but μὲν (as propoſed by Winſtanley) is the right reading, inſtead of μὴ, as the perſon who undertakes to imitate ἀδυνάτα may be ſaid προαιρίσθαι μὴ ὀρθῶς.

of

of the art he treats of; but he may be excuſed, if he attains his purpoſed end by it, viz. if he renders that, or any other part of the poem more intereſting, an example of which may be drawn from the purſuit of Hector (2). Yet, if this end can be obtained in a greater, or even a leſs degree, without deviating from the rules (3) of art, the fault would be with-

(2) See chapter xxiv.

(3) So Batteux, Ordonez, and Segni, making a ſtop after τέχνην. Gouſton ſays, "Diſtingue poſt "ἡμάρτηται, non poſt τέχνην:" which gives a different, and, in my opinion, not ſo good a meaning, viz. "*nihiloque minus* contra artem eam, quæ de "his eſt, peccatum ſit; haud recte ſe habet, *neque* "*hercle excuſari poteſt.*" Here the words in Italics muſt be inſerted to complete the ſenſe, which are not required in the other mode.

out

out excuſe; for errors ſhould be entirely avoided, if poſſible. Errors ariſing from the art (4) itſelf are certainly more abſurd (5) than from accident; for it is a leſs fault to paint a hind well with horns, from ignorance of its nature, than to paint one (6) ill without horns.

(4) Not, as in the preceding paſſages, from ignorance in the art the poet treats of, but from want of ſkill in the poetic art.

(5) I follow the reading propoſed by Winſtanley: ἀτοπώτερον for ἔτι ποτέρων.

(6) Batteux has tranſlated this, "que d'avoir "mal peint une biche *avec* des cornes:" which muſt be a miſtake ariſing from inadvertency, as this would deſtroy the oppoſition, the laſt example incurring the blame both of ignorance and bad execution.

If a poet is further blamed for not deſcribing perſons as they are, the objection may be anſwered by ſaying, he deſcribes them as they ought to be. Like Sophocles (7), who ſaid he drew the characters

(7) "The meaning of which is, Sophocles, "from his more extended commerce with mankind, had enlarged and widened the narrow partial conception of *particular* characters, into a "compleat comprehenſion of the *kind*. Whereas "the philoſophical Euripides, having been moſtly "converſant in the academy, when he came to "look into life, keeping his eye too intent on "ſingle really exiſting perſonages, ſunk the *kind* "in the *individual*; and ſo painted his characters, "naturally indeed, and *truly*, with regard to the "objects in view, but ſometimes without that general and univerſally ſtriking likeneſs which is "demanded to the full exhibition of poetical "truth." Note on v. 317 of Hor. Art. Poet. by the Biſhop of Worceſter.

of

of men as they ought to be, and Euripides as they were. But if it does not come under either of these descriptions, it may be said it is according to received opinion, as in what relates to the gods. For the things we say of them may neither be better than they really are, nor according to truth; since, as Xenophanes observes, "in these (8) things there is nothing "evident." Or, if the objection cannot be answered by saying it is better than the common opinion, perhaps it may be said that the fact was actually so at that time, as in this instance:

"A wood of spears stood by, that fix'd upright:"
Il. x.

(8) Οὐ ζαφῆ ταῦτα. VITTORIO, and HEINSIUS, who quotes the lines of Xenophanes, which begin,

Καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὔτις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν.

for ſuch was then the uſual order of placing them, as it is now among the Illyrians.

In examining whether a thing is either ſaid or done, properly or improperly, we are not only to regard whether the thing itſelf is good or bad, but we muſt conſider the character of the actor or ſpeaker, as well as concerning whom, and to whom, and for what cauſe, he ſpeaks or acts; as, for example, if it would be a greater advantage to receive it, or a greater diſadvantage to omit it.

Objections to the language may be anſwered by conſidering the expreſſions as foreign. As when Homer ſays,

(9) "On mules the infection firſt began," Il. i.

(9) The objection muſt be, that, as the Greeks came by ſea, they could not want mules.

it

it may be obſerved that οὐρῆας ſignifies centinels as well as mules. And when he ſays of Dolon Εἶδος μὲν ἦεν κάκος, "Bad was his form," Il. x. it may be anſwered, that εἶδος κάκος may not mean a deformed body, but an ugly (10) countenance, the Cretans calling a perſon with a handſome face εὐειδὴς. And ſo of

"Now fill with livelier (11) wine the mantling
"bowl:" Il. ix.

where the word "livelier" may not mean leſs diluted with water for the purpoſe of intemperance, but wine filled haſtily.

(10) Pope, therefore, renders it,
"Not bleſs'd by nature with the charms of face."

(11) Ζωρότεραν δὲ κέραιρε. "Quidam etiam quaſi "ζωηρὸς dictum voluerunt ut *vivacior* potus." — STEPH. THES.

Objections too may be anſwered by conſidering the expreſſions as metaphorical. As

"The other gods and men in ſleep profound
"All night were wrapp'd:"—— Il. ii.

(12) ſince *all* has been uſed inſtead of

(12) The other examples which precede this illuſtration, viz.

Ἦτοι ὅτ' ἐς πεδίον τὸ Τρωϊκὸν ἀθρησίεν,

and

Αὐλῶν συρίγγων θ' ὁμαδὸν,

I have omitted, as no notice is taken of either of them in the text. But the other line is manifeſtly alluded to, viz. παννύχιοι for τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος τῆς νυκτὸς. I think the whole paſſage is corrupted, and that the example of παννύχιοι ſhould be taken from the beginning of Il. x. where the next quotations oon follow: eſpecially as, in a MS. in the library at Paris, No. 1741, in all the Medicean MSS. and the tranſlation of Valla, after παννύχιοι, inſtead of καὶ we have ἅμα δὴ φησὶν.

many

many by a metaphor; the *whole* being ſome *great quantity*, or *much*. Or as

(13) "Orion, ſole of all the ſtarry train,
"Ne'er bathes his blazing forehead in the main:" Il. xviii.

where Orion is called the *ſole* by a metaphor, becauſe he is the moſt known and conſpicuous.

Sometimes the objection may be anſwered by means of the accent, as the difficulties in the following paſſage are ſolved by Hippias the Thaſian. Δίδομεν

(13) Though Pope (whom I quote when he does not deviate too widely from the original) has a long note on this obſervation of Ariſtotle, he has taken no notice of οἵη in his tranſlation, on which account I have been obliged to alter it.

δὲ οἱ (14) will imply a promiſe; but change the accent from the antepenult to the penult, and διδόμεν will only be an order to the dream to give hope. And τὸ μὲν ἔ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ, with the circumflex on the ου, will have the abſurd ſignification of "dry wood rotted by the "rain;" but remove the circumflex, and it will be, "which was not rotted by the "rain." (15)

(14) This alludes to the order given by Jupiter to the dream in Il. ii. to deceive Agamemnon. The line is not extant. I have been obliged to paraphraſe this paragraph to make it at all intelligible.

(15) — "Of ſome ſtately oak the laſt remains,
"Or hardy fir, unperiſh'd by the rains."
POPE, Il. xxiii.

Objections

Objections may be confuted by the diviſion of the ſentence; as in this inſtance,

(16) "Mortal were now, what erſt immortal were;
"Mix'd, what were pure."———

Or by ambiguous expreſſions; as

(17) —"Now of two parts the night had wan'd
"The larger ſhare, but yet a third remain'd:"
Il. x.

where the word larger is ambiguous.

(16) Αὖψα δὲ θνητ' ἐφύοντο, τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατ' εἶναι,
Ζώρα τε πρὶν, κέχριτο ———

The ſenſe of this depends on the punctuation: by putting the comma after ζώρα inſtead of πρὶν, in the ſecond line, the meaning of it is exactly reverſed, and will be, "Thoſe things became pure, which "before were mixed."

(17) The larger part of two thirds of the night, not a part larger than two thirds; for then another third could not have been left.

——— παρώχηκεν δὲ πλέων νὺξ
Τῶν δύο μοίρεων, τριτάτη δ' ἔτι μοῖρα λελείπται.

Of which Ariſtotle judged it ſufficient to quote the firſt part only, where there is really no ambiguity.

Or

Or by the eſtabliſhed cuſtom of ſpeech; as the word κεκραμένον (18), *mixed*, is uſed for wine, whence the poet writes,

—"Greaves of newly plated tin:" Il. xxi.

and artificers in ſteel are called braziers, and Ganymede is ſaid

——"To pour the wine to Jove:" Il. xx.

though the gods are not ſuppoſed to drink wine. But this may be conſidered as metaphorical. It is right alſo, when a word ſeems to be capable of giving contrary ſenſes, to examine how many ſigni-

(18) So in Hebrew the participle מִמְסָךְ, *mixed*, is uſed for wine. The ancients ſeldom drank wine unmixed. In a preceding example, Homer was not blamed for making his heroes intemperate by drinking wine ζώρον, abſolutely pure, but ζωρότερον, purer than uſual.

fications

fications it may have in the paſſage before us; as in theſe lines of Homer:

" Five plates of various metal, various mould,
" Compos'd the ſhield, of braſs each outward
" fold,
" Of tin each inward, and the middle gold;
" There ſtuck the lance:" ——— Il. xx.

where the ſenſe of the word *ſtuck* muſt be that the lance was ſtopped by the golden plate. For, (19) in conſidering the num-

(19) I have followed Batteux here, whoſe emendation and interpretation of this paſſage I think excellent. He reads πολλαχῶς for ποσαχῶς. Though, if inſtead of ἐνδέχεται we read ἐκδέχεται, the paſſage may be rendered, " The ambiguity ariſing from " the different meanings of the ſame word may be " removed thus; if any one ſhould contend that " the ſpear penetrated to the oppoſite ſide," (what follows will then be connected with ἐπισκοπεῖν ποσαχῶς ἂν σημαίνει τοῦτο ἐν τῷ εἰρημένῳ, ——— ἢ ὡς Γλαύκων λέγει κ. τ. λ.) " either the word may bear ſeveral " meanings, or the objector may be under a mi- " ſtake."

ber

ber of meanings the word may have here, the moſt natural will ſeem, that it ſtopped without penetrating. Or objections may be anſwered in the words of Glaüco, who ſays, "That ſome men, taking up "an opinion haſtily, and then reaſoning "from prejudice in favour of that opi-"nion, will blame any thing that is con-"trary to what they have preſuppoſed" This is what happened concerning Icarius (20); for, conceiving him to be a Laconian, it has been thought abſurd that Telemachus ſhould not meet him when he went to Lacedæmon: while, perhaps, the poet follows the opinion of the Ce-

(20) The father of Penelope. This alludes to the voyage of Telemachus to Sparta. Od. iv.

phalonians,

phalonians, who aſſert that Ulyſſes married among them, and that Icadius, and not Icarius, was the name of his father-in-law. This objection, therefore, ariſes probably from a miſtake.

The impoſſible ſhould be conſidered as conducing, on the whole, to the end of the poem, or to excellence of character, or as being agreeable to received opinion. For, as to the end of the poem, it is better to chuſe probable impoſſibility, than improbable poſſibility. And (21) as to excellence of character, it may be proper,

(21) Winſtanley's tranſpoſition of this paſſage, which I have implicitly followed, has cleared up every difficulty, and rendered the antitheſis complete.

as

as in the paintings of Zeuxis, to give examples of perfection. And as to the ſeeming abſurdities that are received from common opinion, they may not, perhaps, be contrary to reaſon; for many improbable events may have really happened.

As to the way in which contradictions may be excuſed, they ſhould be conſidered in the ſame light as confutations in an argument. We ſhould obſerve if the ſame thing is ſpoken of, or to the ſame perſon, or in the ſame manner; if the perſon ſpeaks in his own perſon, and concerning what things, and (22) whether he that

(22) Η ὁ ἀν φρονίμως ὑποθήται. This has been generally rendered, "If it is what a ſenſible man "might lay down as his opinion." But this does not

that may be delivering his opinion is a ſenſible man. The reprehenſions of impiety and abſurdity will indeed be juſt, when they are introduced without neceſſity. Neither ſhould abſurdity be employed,

not ſeem agreeable with what goes before. Ariſtotle ſpeaks of excuſing contradictions, and ſays the circumſtances of the ſpeaker, and the things ſpoken of, &c. ſhould be conſidered. But whether the things are, or are not, what a ſenſible man might ſay, can only relate to the things themſelves that are ſaid, and not to any circumſtances attending the ſaying of them, or the things they may have reference to. If a ſentiment is ſuch as a ſenſible man may deliver, it will want no excuſe, as no blame can be incurred. And, by ſaying it is what a ſenſible man ought not to deliver, the fault, indeed, is pointed out, but no excuſe made, which is here the expreſs deſign of Ariſtotle. His meaning muſt certainly be, that, before an abſurdity is blamed,

ployed, as it is by Euripides in his Egeus (23); or impiety, as in the character of Menelaus, in his Oreſtes.

The objections of criticiſm may then be reduced to theſe five ſpecies: the impoſſible, the abſurd, the hurtful, the contradictory, and the errors againſt the rules of the art. The anſwers to theſe objections may be collected from what we have

ed, the character of the perſon who utters it ſhould be conſidered; and adds afterwards, but when the character of the ſpeaker does not render the abſurdity neceſſary, as in the caſe of Egeus, the fault is inexcuſable. I would, therefore, tranſpoſe the words thus: ἢ ὃ ἂν ὑποθῆται, φρονίμως; which I have ventured to adopt in the tranſlation, as it agrees with the other reaſons of excuſe.

(23) See Winſtanley's note on this paſſage.

ſaid,

ſaid, and they are twelve (24) in number.

(24) I. If the poem is made more intereſting. II. If the poet errs from ignorance in any particular art. III. If, inſtead of deſcribing things as they are, he deſcribes them as they ought to be. IV. Or according to received opinion. V. Or as they actually were at the time the events are ſuppoſed to have happened. VI. Or according to the circumſtances of time and place, and the character of the ſpeaker or actor. VII. Or by the uſe of foreign words. VIII. Or by metaphors. IX. Or by the accent. X. Or by the diviſion of the ſentence, i. e. the punctuation. XI. Or by the different and ambiguous meanings a word may have. XII. Or by the error of the objector, who firſt takes up an opinion without foundation, and then blames the poet for ſaying what may not agree with that opinion.

CHAP. XXVI.

TRAGIC IMITATION AND EPIC COMPARED.—PREFERENCE GIVEN TO TRAGEDY.—CONCLUSION.

IT may now, perhaps, be aſked, whether tragic or epic imitation is moſt perfect. If the imitation is to be preferred which is leaſt adapted to the vulgar (1) and moſt calculated to pleaſe the

(1) Ηττον φορτικὴ. So Ariſtophanes, Κωμωδιὰ φορτικὴ: "comœdia inepta, inſulſa." See, alſo, Ariſtot. Polit. l. viii. chapter vi. Segni renders it *vile*: "ha manco del vile."

politeſt

politeſt ſpectators, that which imitates every (2) thing is clearly moſt adapted to the vulgar, as not being intelligible without the addition of much movement and (3) action. As bad players on the flute turn round, if they would imitate

(2) Not only imitates actions, taken in a dramatic ſenſe, but ſhapes, motions, &c. Goulſton tranſlates it "eam quæ omnimodo (numero et "harmoniâ) imitatur," taking ἅπαντα adverbially.

(3) The words ἂν μὴ αὐτὸς προσθῇ have occaſioned much difficulty. Toup propoſes to read ἂν μὴ αὐλὸς προσῇ, as if the whole effect was to depend on the accompaniment. But how will this agree with the ſubſequent compariſon of the bad flute player uſing action to make himſelf underſtood? I would rather read ἂν μὴ αὐτὸς προσῇ, and ſuppoſe αὐτὸς to mean the actor: "unleſs (the "actor) himſelf appeared."

the motion of a diſk. Or, when they perform the part of Scylla, are obliged to pull (4) the leader of the chorus. Now, the ſame cenſure that the older actors caſt on the modern ones, may, according (5) to the judgment of its enemies, be applied to tragedy. For Miniſcus called Callipides a monkey for carrying his action too far. And the ſame opinion is entertained of Pindarus. Tragedy, therefore, with all its requiſites, they ſay, has the ſame relation to the epopee, that the modern actors have to the older ones,

(4) To imitate the drawing of the ſhips.

(5) I have added this to make the ſenſe clear, as Ariſtotle obviouſly ſtates this objection for the purpoſe of confuting it.

and

and that the epopee is calculated for politer perſons who do not require the addition of action and ſcenery: and tragedy, for meaner perſons, being more adapted to the vulgar, and conſequently inferior.

But, in the firſt place, this accuſation does not affect the poet, but the actor. And, beſides, it is poſſible to uſe much action in reciting epic poetry, as was practiſed by Soſiſtratus, and even in ſinging, as was done by Mnaſtheus of Opus. Neither is all action to be deſpiſed, any more than all kinds of dancing, but only that which is bad. So Callipides was blamed, as ſome now are, for imitating women of bad character.

Tragedy, alſo, as well as the epopee, may attain its end without repreſentation, and diſcover its merit by being read: therefore, if it is better in other reſpects, no objection can be raiſed from the repreſentation, ſince that is not abſolutely neceſſary.

Tragedy, then, has every requiſite in common with the epopee, (ſince it may equally uſe verſe,) (6) with the additional or-

(6) Ἔξει χρῆσθαι: "may uſe (employ) its own iambic verſe, to attain its end without the aſſiſtance of muſic and action." If it had been ἔξει ἴχειν, the criticiſm of Winſtanley would have been juſt, who ſays, if its own iambic verſe had been meant, it ſhould have been χρῆται. But if hexameter verſe is meant here by τῷ μέτρῳ, Ariſtotle argues very unlike himſelf, by contending for the ſuperiority

ornaments of muſic and ſcenery, which are no ſmall parts of its compoſition, and which render the pleaſure it excites more ſtriking. It is, therefore, affecting, both when it is read (7) and acted. And it poſſeſſes another advantage, in having the period of its duration confined to a ſhorter ſpace. For, being, as it were, condenſed, it is more agreeable than if it were protracted through a longer ſuc-

riority of tragedy, not from what it was, but from what it might be made; not only contrary to the univerſal practice of the Grecian theatre, but to the directions of nature herſelf, who, he ſays, in chapter iv. pointed out the iambic as the proper verſe for the drama.

(7) Certainly, I think, ἀναγνώσει, and not ἀναγνώρισει.

ceſſion of time. What would be the effect, for example, if the Œdipus of Sophocles were to be put into as many verſes as the Iliad? It may further be added, that the epic imitation has leſs unity, ſince there is no epic poem that cannot furniſh ſubjects for ſeveral (8) tragedies. For ſhould the fable be confined to one action, it would either ap-

(8) Ariſtotle ſays, chapter xxiii. "That the "Iliad and Odyſſey would only produce one, or, at "moſt, two tragedies each." This ſeems a contradiction. But, perhaps, the objection may be anſwered by one of the methods propoſed in the preceding chapter. We muſt examine if it is τὸ αὐτὸ, "the ſame thing," that is ſpoken of. There, I imagine, Ariſtotle ſpoke of the ſimple argument of the poem, and here he conſiders it as adorned and augmented by epiſodes.

pear

pear trifling from its ſhortneſs, or, if it were lengthened in proportion (9) to the length of the verſe, it would be languid and inſipid: but if it is variegated, I mean compounded of various actions, it muſt be deficient in point of unity. Even the Iliad and Odyſſey contain many parts, each of which has in itſelf a conſiderable degree of bulk, and yet theſe poems are as much the imitation of one action, as the nature of the compoſition would admit.

If tragedy, then, excels in all theſe cir-

(9) Ἢ ἀκολουθεῖνται τῷ τὸ μέτρῳ μήκει. That is, if a ſingle fable, like that of Œdipus, ſhould be ſpun out, by means of the verſe, to the ſame length as the Iliad or Odyſſey.

cumſtances,

cumſtances, as well as in the effect produced by the art itſelf; (for they ſhould neither of them produce an accidental pleaſure, but only that which we have mentioned;) it will certainly be more excellent than the epopee, becauſe it attains its end more effectually.

And here I ſhall conclude what I had to ſay concerning tragedy, and epic poetry, as to themſelves, the number and difference of their ſpecies, the cauſes of their merits and defects, the objections that may be made to them, and the manner in which thoſe objections may be anſwered.

2 AP 63

FINIS.

New BOOKS *printed for* JOHN STOCKDALE, *oppoſite Burlington-houſe, Piccadilly.*

POEMS on various Subjects. By Henry James Pye, Eſq. M. P. Elegantly printed in Two Vols. 8vo. and embelliſhed with beautiful Frontiſpieces. Price 12s. in Boards.

A Collection of Original Royal Letters, written by King Charles the Firſt and Second, King James the Second, and the King and Queen of Bohemia. Together with Original Letters, written by Prince Rupert, Charles Louis Count Palatine, the Ducheſs of Hanover, and ſeveral other diſtinguiſhed Perſons, from the Year 1619 to 1665. Dedicated with Permiſſion to his Majeſty. By Sir George Bromley, Bart. (Ornamented with elegant Engravings, from Original Paintings by Cooper, Sir Peter Lely, &c. executed by Meſſrs. Sherwins, of the Queen of Bohemia, Emanuel Scrope Howe, Prince Rupert, and Ruperta, natural Daughter of Prince Rupert; and a Plate of Autographs and Seals.) In One Volume. Price 10s. 6d. in Boards.

Philoſophical and Critical Enquiries concerning Chriſtianity. By Monſieur Charles Bonnet, of Geneva, F. R. S. Member of the Royal Academy of Sciences of Paris, &c. &c. Tranſlated from the French by John Lewis Boiſſier, Eſq. (Ornamented with an elegant Engraving of the Author, by Sherwin, and neatly printed in 1 Vol. 8vo. Price 6s. in Boards.)

Stockdale's Edition of Shakſpeare; including, in One Volume, 8vo. the whole of his Dramatick Works;

Works; with Explanatory Notes, compiled from various Commentators. To which are prefixed his Life and Will. Price only 15s.

†‡† Gentlemen in the Country, finding a Difficulty in procuring the above valuable Work, by directing a Line to Mr. Stockdale, oppoſite Burlington-Houſe, Piccadilly (appointing the Payment thereof in London), ſhall have it immediately forwarded (Carriage paid) to any Part of Great Britain.

The Indian Vocabulary of Perſian, Bengal, Turkiſh, and Arabic Words, which occur in the Articles againſt Mr. Haſtings and his Anſwers, alſo in the different Reports, Books, and Papers, on Eaſt-India Affairs; together with Explanations of the Names of certain Offices, and other local Expreſſions contained in the ſame: reviſed and corrected by ſeveral Gentlemen diſtinguiſhed for their Knowledge of the Oriental Languages. To which are prefixed the Forms of Impeachments. Neatly printed in a pocket Volume. Price 3s. 6d.

A Tranſlation of the Memoirs of Eradut Khan, a Nobleman of Hindoſtan; containing intereſting Anecdotes of the Emperor Aumulgeer Aurungzebe, and of his Succeſſors, Shaw Aulum and Jehaunder Shaw; in which are diſplayed the Cauſes of the very precipitate Decline of the Mogul Empire in India. By Jonathan Scott, Captain in the Service of the Honourable Eaſt India Company, and private Perſian Tranſlator to Warren Haſtings, Eſq; late Governor General of Bengal, &c. 4to. 4s. 6d. Boards.

Sermons

Sermons on important and intereſting ſubjects. By the Rev. Percival Stockdale. Illuſtrated with an elegant Engraving of the Author. Price 6s. in Boards.

The Hiſtory of New Holland, from its firſt Diſcovery in 1616, to the preſent Time, with a particular Account of its Produce and Inhabitants, and a Deſcription of Botany Bay. Alſo a Liſt of the Naval, Marine, Military and Civil Eſtabliſhment. Illuſtrated with a large Map of New Holland, a Chart of Botany Bay, and a General Chart from England to Botany Bay, neatly coloured. To which is prefixed, an Introductory Diſcourſe on Baniſhment. By the Right Hon. William Eden. In 1 vol. 8vo. Price 6s. in Boards.

The Hiſtory of the Union between England and Scotland; with a Collection of Original Papers relating thereto. By the celebrated Daniel de Foe. With an Introduction, in which the Conſequences and Probability of a like Union between this Country and Ireland are conſidered, by John Lewis de Lolme, Author of the Work on the Conſtitution of England. To which is prefixed a Life of the Author, and a copious Index. In One large Volume Quarto, containing One Thouſand Pages, with an elegant Engraving of the Author. Price 1l. 10s. in Boards.

Hiſtorical Tracts. By Sir John Davis, Attorney-General, and Speaker of the Houſe of Commons in Ireland; conſiſting of, 1. A Diſcovery of the true Cauſe why Ireland was never brought under Obedience to the Crown of England. 2. A

Letter

Letter to the Earl of Saliſbury, on the State of Ireland in 1607. 3. A Letter to the Earl of Saliſbury in 1610, giving an Account of the Plantation in Ulſter. 4. A Speech to the Lord Deputy in 1613, tracing the ancient Conſtitution of Ireland. To which is prefixed, a new Life of the Author, from authentic Documents. In one Volume Octavo, Price 5s. in Boards, or 6s. in Calf and lettered.

*** The above Work is ſpoken of by Mr. De Lolme, in the higheſt Terms, in his Eſſay on the Union.

The Beauties of the Britiſh Senate; taken from the Debates of the Lords and Commons, from the Beginning of the Adminiſtration of Sir Robert Walpole, to the End of the Second Seſſion of the Right Honourable William Pitt. Being an impartial Selection of, or faithful Extracts from, the moſt eminent Speeches, delivered in the Courſe of a moſt important and truly intereſting Period, of more than Sixty Years, ſeverally arranged under their reſpective Heads, with the Names of the Members, to whom they are aſcribed, annexed thereto. To which is prefixed, The Life of Sir Robert Walpole. In Two Volumes, Octavo. Price 10s. 6d. in Boards, or 12s. bound in Calf and lettered.

Debates in Parliament. By Dr. Samuel Johnſon. In Two Volumes, 8vo. Price 12s. in Boards.

Four Tracts, By Thomas Day, Eſq. In One Volume 8vo. Price 10s. 6d.

A Com-

A Complete Geographical Dictionary; or, Univerſal Gazetteer, of Antient and Modern Geography: containing a full, particular, and accurate Deſcription of the known World in Europe, Aſia, Africa, and America; compriſing a complete Syſtem of Geography, illuſtrated with correct Maps and beautiful Views of the principal Cities, &c. and Chronological Tables of the Sovereigns of Europe. The Geographical Parts by John Seally, A. M. Member of the Roman Academy; Author of the Hiſtoire Chronologique, ſacrée et profane: Elements of Geography and Aſtronomy, &c. &c. interſperſed with Extracts from the private Manuſcripts of one of the Officers who accompanied Captain Cook in his Voyage to the Southern Hemiſphere. The Aſtronomical Parts from the Papers of the late Mr. Iſrael Lyons, of Cambridge, Aſtronomer in Lord Mulgrave's Voyage to the Northern Hemiſphere. In Two large Volumes, Quarto, bound in Calf, gilt, and lettered, Price 2l. 2s.

Godwin's Lives of the Biſhops. By Richardſon. Illuſtrated with Seventy Copper-plates, and a beautiful Engraving of Godwin, by Virtu. In One large Volume, Folio. Price only 8s. 6d. in Boards.

Hiſtory of Virginia. By his Excellency Thomas Jefferſon, Miniſter Plenipotentiary from the United States to the Court of France. Illuſtrated with a large Map, comprehending the whole of Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, and Pennſylvania, with Parts of ſeveral other of the United States

of

of America. In One Volume Octavo. Price 7s. in Boards.

The History of the Revolution of South Carolina. By David Ramsay, M. D. Illustrated with a large Map of South Carolina and Parts adjacent, shewing the Movements of the British and American Armies, together with several other Plans, shewing the Disposition and Stations of the Fleets and Armies. In Two large Volumes, 8vo. Price 12s in Boards.

The Constitutions of the several Independent States of America; with a Preface and Dedication to the Duke of Portland. By the Reverend William Jackson. In One Vol. 8vo. Price 6s. in Boards.

Considerations on the present Situation of Great Britain, and her Commercial Connections. By Richard Champion, Esq. In One Volume, 8vo. Price 5s. in Boards.

An Estimate of the Comparative Strength of Great Britain during the present and four preceding Reigns, and of the Losses of her Trade from every War since the Revolution. By George Chalmers, Esq. Price 3s. 6d. sewed, or 5s. Calf lettered.

2 AP 63

Remarks on the favourite Ballet of Cupid and Psyche, with some Account of the Pantomime of the Ancients, and other Observations. By Robert Nares, A. M. Chaplain to his Royal Highness the Duke of York, &c. neatly printed on fine Writing-paper. Price 1s. 6d.